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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents a collection of studies that use laboratory experiments to
investigates how changes in the rules of an auction or its environment can affect
its outcome. The auctions studied vary from a simple auction-like setting,
where the optimization problem is an individual-choice task, to a complex
market with sequential multi-unit auctions and opportunities for resale. The
experimental results indicate limitations of existing theories or provide helpful
insights for the market designer.
In the ancient times auctions were used for selling wives and slaves, mine
concessions, war booty, and various kinds of commodities (Klemperer 2004).
More recently they have become an omnipresent trading instrument used in
C2C transactions (usually via online auction platforms), private and public
procurement of goods and services, as well as regulated markets, such as those
for electricity and for emission permits (Klemperer 1999; Krishna 2002). This
surge in the application of auctions in a variety of context has a number of
explanations, including the rapid development of information technologies, ad-
vances in the fields of game theory and experimental economics, as well as the
willingness of politicians to adopt auctions instead of subjective competitive
hearings and inherently inefficient lotteries that were previously used to reg-
ulate the allocation of goods and services (Kittsteiner and Ockenfels 2006;
Milgrom 2004).
However, given the well established theoretical, empirical, and anecdotal
evidence about the way even subtle changes in the auction context or auction
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rules can affects its outcome1, the spread of auctions has created not only
opportunities but challenges, as well. While information technologies have
decreased the costs of conducting and participating in an auction substan-
tially (Greiner et al. 2012), by resolving the necessity for physical presence
of the bidders in online auctions, they have created a new strategic environ-
ment, where the number of competitors as well as their characteristics are
surrounded by uncertainty (Chen, Katuscak and Ozdenoren 2007). Further-
more, the proliferation of auctions in private procurement, where, among many
other complexities, the buyer can have long-standing relationships with (one
of) the suppliers (Arozamena and Weinschelbaum 2009; Walker 1999), has
increased the importance of understanding how such relationships can be ac-
counted for in the rules of the auction. Finally, as regulators started adopting
auctions to allocate licenses and to organize new markets, such as those for
emission permits, the high complexity of the market environment has made it
necessary to supplement insights from economic analysis with computational
and experimental analysis (Roth 2002).
Some of the questions that arise through the spread of auctions to these new
environments are: How does uncertainty (in online auctions) affect behavior?
Is one particular auction design more suitable than another for allowing the
buyer to account for her existing relationships with (one of) the suppliers?
Would theoretically equivalent auctions interact identically with a subsequent
market?
This thesis uses theoretical and experimental tools to address these ques-
tions. Theoretical analysis helps to develop the intuition behind different de-
sign choices and isolate particular effects (Kittsteiner and Ockenfels 2006).
However, reality is often too complex, so that a tractable formal analysis is
possible only under certain assumptions and simplifications of the real world.
Furthermore, formal analysis alone may be incapable of providing the practi-
tioners with clear recommendations (see, for example, the analysis in Ockenfels
(2009) concerning the optimal frequency of auctions in the European Emission
1For an overview of theoretical research, see Klemperer (1999) and Krishna (2002), for
example. For an overview of empirical research on the effect of auction rules in online auc-
tions, see Ockenfels, Reiley and Sadrieh (2006) and Greiner, Ockenfels and Sadrieh (2012).
For an overview of experimental research, see Kagel (1995) and Kagel and Levin (2011). For
selected examples of anecdotal evidence, see Klemperer (2002) and Milgrom (2004).
2
Trading System). Hence, insights from empirical and experimental approaches
are often needed to validate the theoretical predictions in more complex sit-
uations that are closer to reality. While empirical analysis with field data is
helpful, it is not always possible (before a market has been created, for exam-
ple) or feasible (due to unclear causal relationships)(Kittsteiner and Ockenfels
2006; Lusk and Shogren 2007). Laboratory experiments allow the researcher
to study causal effects in a highly controlled environment with real (bound-
edly rational) agents taking the decisions. Laboratory experiments have, thus,
become an important complement to theoretical and empirical analysis with
field data, especially with regard to investigating the applicability and limits
of existing theories and testing key features of new market mechanism before
they come into existence in an environment that closely resembles the field
environment (Kittsteiner and Ockenfels 2006; Roth 1995).2
The experimental studies presented here complement the existing theoret-
ical and empirical literature that addresses the questions mentioned above.
The first study (Chapter 2) investigates what impact uncertainty about one’s
competitiveness has on bidding behavior. The second one (Chapter 3) com-
pares how two mechanisms for favoritism affect the auction outcome. And the
third one (Chapter 4) studies the effects of the frequency of auctions for the
allocation of emission permits as well as free allocation on the efficiency of an
emission trading market, which is designed to closely mirror the properties of
the European Emission Trading System. The first two experiments reveal lim-
itations of existing theories, while the last one provides helpful insights about
the way theoretically equivalent mechanisms perform in an environment with
resale opportunities.
The payoff-maximizing bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction optimizes the
trade-off between the surplus achieved upon winning and the probability to
win. The probability to win for any given bid depends on a number of charac-
teristics of one’s competitors, which are often not known. In online auctions,
for example, where bidders are geographically dispersed and anonymous, ambi-
2For example, one of the contributions of the early literature on experimental auctions
reviewed in Kagel (1995) was rejecting the well-known revenue equivalence theorem, while
Holt, Shobe, Burtraw, Palmer and Goeree (2007) tested a variety of designs for the auction-
ing of emission permits within the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the US before one
was implemented.
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guity may surround the number of rivals as well as their valuations. Similarly,
in laboratory auctions, bidders who interact for the first time will be uncertain
about the bidding strategies of their opponents.
Chapter 2, therefore, provides theoretical and experimental analysis of bid-
ding behavior in a simple, auction-like environment with and without ambigu-
ity. In particular, participants are required to submit bids for a fictitious good.
Their bid competes against computerized bids, the exact distribution of which
is either known or not known. The optimization problem is, thus, indepen-
dent of common and consistent beliefs required in the majority of the auction
literature and makes it possible to eliminate other sources of ambiguity, such
as uncertainty about the bidding strategies of one’s competitors. We observe
that bids in the ambiguous environment are significantly lower than those in
the environment without ambiguity, thus, rejecting the predictions of standard
ambiguity theories. By adapting Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002)’s analysis of
the effect of nonlinear probability weighting on bidding behavior to account for
ambiguity preferences according to Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)’s
model of smooth ambiguity, we demonstrate that a combination of pessimistic
beliefs and nonlinear probability weighting can organize the empirical findings.
While the majority of the auction literature assumes that the seller and
the bidders have no prior relationships, this is often not the case. A pre-
auction agreement between the seller and one of the bidders may exist and
affect the rules of the auction. Such agreements usually put the bidder in a
more favorable position relative to her competitors and can therefore serve to
extract rents from the non-preferred bidders (Choi 2009) and as protection of
established relationships (Walker 1999). The experimental study presented in
Chapter 3, thus, investigates how favoritism in auctions can be used to increase
the rents the seller and the preferred bidder extract from the other bidders.
Two forms of favoritism are compared to a standard first-price auction. The
first one, among practitioners also known as “last call”, gives the preferred
bidder the right of first refusal. Hence, she can win the auction by matching
the highest bid of the other bidders. The second one optimizes the seller and
the preferred bidder’s expected surplus by awarding the good to the other bid-
ders only if their bids exceed an optimal reserve price. Both mechanisms are
formally studied in Burguet and Perry (2009) and predicted to increase the
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seller and the preferred bidder’s joint surplus. However, the optimal mecha-
nism requires that the seller learns the preferred bidder’s valuations. She does
so via an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism, which turns out to lack
robustness to boundedly rational behavior.
The experimental results support part of the theoretical predictions – the
auction revenue and the payoff of the other bidders deteriorate as a result of
favoritism. However, the results also show some limitations of Burguet and
Perry (2009)’s formal analysis, which requires risk-neutral bidders and truth-
telling under the the optimal mechanism. In particular, only the mechanism
with the right of first refusal increases the joint surplus of the seller and the
preferred bidder and the auction revenue deteriorates more under the opti-
mal mechanism than under the auction with the right of first refusal. It is
shown that the results can be organized by accounting for risk aversion and
for boundedly rational behavior.
Finally, Chapter 4 presents the results of an economic experiment that stud-
ies behavior in repeated multi-unit auctions with a resale market. Whereas
the first two studies are concerned with relatively simple environments, where
the complexity of the real world is highly reduced, this one attempts to closely
mirror the design of an existing market – the European Emission Trading Sys-
tem. By considering the majority of design aspects of this particular emissions
trading market, it investigates the effect of auctions and free allocation on
the efficiency of the environmental instrument. The theoretical predictions
are based on a multi-stage competitive equilibrium model. The free allocation
mirrors the average allocation in one of the auction treatments, thus allowing
us to investigate the direct effect of handing out permits for free rather than
against a payment.
The theoretical analysis does not predict any differences in the final allo-
cation and the development of markets with different allocation mechanisms.
We find only partial support for the theoretical predictions. The allocative
efficiency before trade is not significantly different between markets with more
and markets with less frequent auctioning. Furthermore, the method of alloca-
tion – for free or against in payment – does not seem to influence the allocative
efficiency after trade. However, the method of allocation has significant effects
on the ability of the emission trading market to induce cost-efficient emission
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reduction. Less frequent auctioning leads to higher allocative efficiency after
trade, lower price variability, and lower compliance costs than more frequent
auctioning. Free allocation leads to even lower price variability and compli-
ance costs. However, it transfers wealth from the regulator to the regulated
firms and its practical design bears a number of contentious issues, such as how
closures and new entries should be dealt with, for example (Neuhoff, Martinez
and Sato 2006). Hence, when choosing the method of allocation, the regulator
needs to take these factors into account.
The content of Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 was created as a result of joint
projects. The study on ambiguity was conducted in collaboration with Vitali
Gretschko and Axel Ockenfels. Under the guidance of Axel Ockenfels, I de-
veloped the research idea, the motivation for the study, and the experimental
design. I also gathered the experimental data and conducted the statistical
analysis. Vitali Gretschko provided the formal analysis. Axel Ockenfels con-
tributed to the design of the instructions, in particular to the wording and
choice of information in the ambiguity treatment. He also guided me with
very helpful suggestions about the emphasis in the review of related literature
and the focus of the statistical analysis. The study on allocation mechanisms
in emissions trading markets was conducted as a joint project with Veronika
Grimm. The research idea arose during my graduate studies and became more
specific during my first year as a post-graduate, also thanks to the close collab-
oration with Veronika Grimm. She contributed to the study with very helpful
suggestions regarding its structure, its motivation and the literature review,
as well as the organization of the statistical analysis. She also developed most
of the formal analysis.
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Chapter 2
Nonexpected Utility and
Bidding Behavior in First-Price
Auctions With(out) Ambiguity
The content of the following chapter was produced in collaboration with Vitali
Gretschko and Axel Ockenfels.
2.1 Introduction
Deciding on a bid in an auction is a complex process, often driven by
uncertainty and ambiguity. A bidder’s assessment about her competitors’
willingness-to-pay may be very subjective and the distribution of bids that
she faces ambiguous. In a laboratory experiment, we study how ambiguity
about competing bids affects bidding behavior in a simple auction-like envi-
ronment, where ambiguity is operationalized in the spirit of Ellsberg (1961)
as unmeasurable uncertainty or missing information.1 We find that bids in
the ambiguous environment are significantly different from those in the non-
ambiguous environment and show that these differences are not driven by aver-
sion to ambiguity – as common wisdom may suggest – but by an interaction
effect between ambiguity tastes and beliefs, on the one hand, and nonlinear
1Note that one strand of the early literature operationalizes ambiguity as “uncertainty
with second order probabilities”, where probabilities are drawn from a set of known distri-
bution functions with known probabilities of realization. For discussion of the terminology
see Camerer and Weber (1992).
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probability weighting, on the other.
Firms that participate in auctions spend considerable amount of time and
money to determine the optimal bid. In order to place a bid in a first-price
auction, more than just one’s own valuation for the object has to be taken into
account. Beliefs about the distribution of bids of the competing bidders are
required for the optimization process. If the same group of bidders competes
repeatedly for similar objects, those beliefs can become accurate. However, in
many contexts bidders do not have accurate beliefs about their competitors.
For example, Chen et al. (2007) point out that in online auctions, where there
is no physical presence and the bidders can be geographically dispersed, the
number of bidders as well as their valuations are often unknown. Furthermore,
in a setting with heterogeneous, boundedly rational competitors interacting for
the first time, even when a bidder is informed about the distribution of her
competitors’ valuations, the subjective beliefs and risk preferences behind their
bidding strategies may be ambiguous.
To investigate how ambiguity affects behavior, we run a laboratory exper-
iment, which has a simple and parsimonious setup. Each bidder decides on
her bid in an individual-choice task framed as a first-price auction. She knows
that she is facing three symmetric computerized competitors, that the bids of
these competitors are uniformly distributed, and that the lowest possible bid
is 0. In the first treatment she also knows the highest possible bid. In the
second treatment she has no information about the highest possible bid.
We find that bids are significantly lower if the highest possible computerized
bid is ambiguous. We demonstrate that expected utility theory and established
theories of ambiguity aversion are incapable of explaining this result since
they do not predict any differences between the treatments in the particular
experimental setup.2 The intuition behind this result is that in a symmetric
first-price auction the optimal bid in an increasing equilibrium is conditional
on the fact that the bidder has the highest valuation in the auction. Competing
bids that are associated with valuations higher than the valuation of the bidder
do not affect the optimal bid. Hence, a variation of the highest possible bid
should not have an effect as long as it is consistent with symmetry. Given that
2We assume that the highest possible computer bid is sufficiently high to avoid discussion
of corner solutions.
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ambiguity theories make a statement about how subjective beliefs regarding
ambiguous parameters, i.e., the highest possible bid, are formed and weighted,
they also do not predict any treatment differences in our experimental setup.3
To explain the results, we incorporate smooth ambiguity preferences in the
sense of Klibanoff et al. (2005) in a model of non-expected utility. While
the highest possible computerized bid does not affect the optimal bid of an
expected utility maximizer, it does affect the winning probability for any given
bid and thereby the way a non-expected utility maximizer accounts for this
probability in her optimization problem. Under the assumption of nonlinear
probability weighting as axiomized by Prelec (1998), this translates into into
relatively higher bids if the winning probability is believed to be rather high,
and into relatively lower bids if the winning probability is believed to be rather
low. We demonstrate that such combination of nonlinear probability weighting
with ambiguity aversion and pessimistic beliefs can organize the experimental
results.
Previous studies on the impact of ambiguity on the auction outcome have
focused on unknown distributions within known bounds of a given support
(Bose and Daripa 2009; Chen et al. 2007; Lo 1998; Salo and Weber 1995).
Under these conditions, ambiguity aversion in the sense of Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1989) is predicted to lead to higher bids. Experimental studies com-
pare bidding behavior in (potentially) asymmetric auctions, where all bids are
submitted by human competitors. Gu¨th, Selten and Ivanova-Stenzel (2003)
do not find any significant differences between bidding against a competitor
whose valuation stems from a known distribution as opposed to an unknown
distribution. In conclusion, they question the role of beliefs in the bid submis-
sion process. Chen et al. (2007) find that bids are significantly lower under
the ambiguous environment, which, given the prediction of their equilibrium
model, would suggest ambiguity-loving preferences. However, they point out
that such behavior may also be the result of ambiguity aversion and myopic be-
liefs and recommend further explicit studies. Our experimental design allows
3Note that theories of bounded rationality, such as the impulse balance theory (Neuge-
bauer and Selten 2006; Ockenfels and Selten 2005; Selten 2004) and theories of regret
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay 2007), are also incapable
of explaining the differences in behavior we observe. They are based on the assumption that
deviations from the optimal risk-neutral bid arise as a result of opportunity costs, which do
not depend on ambiguity about the highest possible competing bid.
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us to address this issue by studying behavior in a situation where the best reply
depends only on first-order beliefs. Additionally, our data suggests that con-
trary to Gu¨th et al.’s conclusion, beliefs about the distribution of opponents’
bids and with it beliefs about winning probabilities affect the decision-making
process.4
This study contributes to the existing theoretical and empirical literature
on ambiguity by providing formal analysis of the joint effect of ambiguity and
nonlinear probability weighting on bidding behavior and empirical support for
this joint effect. Furthermore, the experimental design, where the auction is
presented as an individual-choice task, allows us, firstly, to exclude any un-
controlled ambiguity, which may arise endogenously from competing against
human bidders, and, secondly, to resolve any potentially contradicting predic-
tions between equilibrium and myopic behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the
experimental design and procedure. In Section 2.3, we develop the theoretical
predictions based on a model of non-expected utility that combines Klibanoff
et al.’s model of smooth ambiguity and Prelec (1998)’s axiomization of non-
expected probability weighting. In the subsequent Section 2.4, we present the
results of our experiment, and the last section concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedure
We study the effect of ambiguity on bidding behavior in a simple individual-
choice experiment, in which one human bidder competes for an indivisible
good against three computer-simulated bids. Valuations of all competitors
are uniformly distributed on [0, 100].5 In the treatment without ambiguity, in
the following referred to as INFO, participants are informed about the exact
distributions of the computerized bids and their own valuations. In the treat-
ment with ambiguity, in the following referred to as NOINFO, participants
are informed only about the lower bound and the uniformity of the respective
4This result is indirectly related to findings in Armantier and Treich (2009) that overbid-
ding in first-price auctions can be partially explained by incorrect beliefs about the proba-
bilities to win for any given bid.
5Valuations are decimal numbers with up to two digits after the decimal point. For
tractability all theoretical analysis assumes continuous distribution. This inconsistency be-
tween the formal analysis and the practical implementation is a common but unavoidable
problem in the literature on experimental auctions.
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distributions. The individual choice is framed as a first-price sealed-bid auc-
tion, in which the highest bid wins and the winner receives a payoff equal to
the difference between her valuation and her bid. In case of a tie, the winner is
randomly determined. The computer-simulated bids correspond to the optimal
bid in a risk-neutral setting, which equals three fourths of the valuation.
In September 2010 and January 2011 we ran a total of four sessions – two for
each treatment. No subject participated in more than one session. The sessions
were held in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. Participants were
students at the University of Cologne with various backgrounds. They were
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and did not have any prior experience
with experimental first-price auctions. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Upon entering the lab,
participants were randomly assigned to a computer terminal. They received
written instructions and were encouraged to ask questions in case of doubt.
Questions were privately answered. The individual-choice task was repeated
over 20 rounds, with one auction per round and new independent draws for
all values. After each auction, participants were informed about whether or
not they received the good, about the auction price, and about their own
payoff. At the end of the experiment, participants responded to a questionnaire
on demographical data and on their experience with laboratory experiments
and auctions in general.6 They could also briefly comment on their bidding
strategy. After all participants had finished answering the questions, they
were privately paid the sum of their earnings over the 20 rounds plus a show-
up fee of EUR 2.5. A total of 64 students participated in the INFO and 62
in the NOINFO treatment. Each session took about 45 minutes to complete
(including the payment stage). The average payoff was EUR 8.53 (SD = 5.04),
without any significant differences between the two treatments.
We employed computerized competitors to avoid a setting, in which even
with full information about the valuations of one’s opponents, bidders may face
6We do not find any significant demographical differences between the subject pools with
one exception – significantly more participants in NOINFO reported to have taken a class
in game theory in comparison to INFO (p = 0.001 for a two-sided t-test). However, as
Table 2.3 in the appendix shows, no effect of this variable on the final payoff is found in any
Ordinary Least Squares regression model that controls for the average valuation over the
20 rounds (and any number of additional control variables, such as gender, field of studies,
etc). Hence, we can safely attribute all differences in bidding behavior reported below to
the treatment effect.
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ambiguity about their opponents’ bidding strategies. Hence, employing com-
puterized competitors allows us to control the exact level of ambiguity and
investigate its effect in a noise-free environment not influenced by interper-
sonal interaction, where factors such as spite (Morgan, Stiglitz and Reis 2003)
and inequality aversion (Ockenfels and Selten 2005), for example, could affect
behavior. Furthermore, facing non-human competitors simplifies the decision
problem from an equilibrium decision to a payoff-maximizing individual-choice
task and resolves the requirement for consistency between actions and proba-
bilistic beliefs of all interacting parties. Experience from previous experiments
on bidding against computerized opponents in auction(-like) environments sug-
gests that the use of computerized instead of human competitors does not affect
the qualitative results (Dorsey and Razzolini 2003; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok 2009; Harrison 1989; Neugebauer and Selten 2006; Walker, Smith and
Cox 1987).
2.3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we demonstrate how the experimental design allows us to
investigate the role of nonlinear probability weighting in auctions with am-
biguity. In particular, we show that neither expected utility, nor ambiguity
aversion, nor ambiguity tastes alone predict any treatment effects, while non-
linear probability weighting together with ambiguity preferences do so. On
the basis of empirical evidence concerning the general form of the probabil-
ity weighting function and the typical tastes and beliefs under ambiguity, we
derive predictions about the expected between-treatment differences.
Consider a setting in which a bidder decides on an optimal bid in a first-price
sealed-bid auction. Her valuation for the auctioned object is x and she is either
informed that the bid of each of her N competitors is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1] or that the bid of each of her competitors is uniformly distributed on
[0, b¯] without any further information on b¯. Let u denote the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function of the bidder and µ her subjective probability
distribution of b¯.
12
Expected Utility
First, suppose the bidder is an expected-utility maximizer. If the bidder knows
that the bids of her competitors are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], her optimal
bid is the solution to
max
b
bNu(x− b). (2.1)
Suppose u and x are such that (2.1) has a unique interior solution.7 The
first-order condition of this optimization problem is
NbN−1u(x− b)− bNu′(x− b) = 0. (2.2)
If, on the other hand, the bidder is only informed that the bids of her com-
petitors are uniformly distributed on [0, b¯] without any information on b¯, her
optimal bid given her subjective probability distribution solves the following
optimization problem:
max
b
∫ ∞
−∞
bN
b¯N
u(x− b)dµ(b¯). (2.3)
Suppose a unique interior solution exists. The first-order condition of this
optimization problem is
∫ ∞
−∞
NbN−1
b¯N
u(x− b)−
bN
b¯N
u′(x− b)dµ(b¯) = 0
⇔
∫ ∞
−∞
NbN−1u(x− b)− bNu′(x− b)dµ(b¯) = 0
⇔NbN−1u(x− b)− bNu′(x− b) = 0.
Thus, the optimal bid does not depend on b¯ – it is the same in both cases
and ambiguity does not affect the bidding behavior of an expected utility
maximizer.
Ambiguity Aversion
Expected utility theory cannot explain behavior in many situations (see Machina
2008, for a brief review of related literature). Given that the treatment vari-
7If, for example, b¯ is sufficiently low, a corner solution also exists, such that b = b¯.
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ation concerns ambiguity about the distribution of competing bids, it is rea-
sonable to expect attitudes towards ambiguity to affect the bidding behavior.
However, in the following we show that a departure from expected utility that
accounts for ambiguity tastes and beliefs in the individual-choice task does not
change the optimal bid. More formally, consider the smooth model of decision
making under ambiguity that was introduced by Klibanoff et al. (2005). The
optimal bid then solves the following optimization problem:
max
b
∫ ∞
−∞
φ
(
bN
b¯N
u(x− b)
)
dµ(b¯). (2.4)
Herein φ is a strictly increasing mapping from R+ to R+. The curvature of
φ corresponds to the subject’s attitude towards ambiguity.8 The first-order
condition can be written as
∫ ∞
−∞
φ′
(
bN
b¯N
u(x− b)
)(
NbN−1
b¯N
u(x− b)−
bN
b¯N
u′(x− b)
)
dµ(b¯) = 0
⇔
∫ ∞
−∞
φ′
(
bN
b¯N
u(x− b)
)
dµ(b¯)
(
NbN−1u(x− b)− bNu′(x− b)
)
= 0. (2.5)
As φ is an increasing function, (2.5) is true if and only if (2.2) is true for
any belief function dµ(b¯). It follows that ambiguity aversion does not affect
the optimal bid. This result is fairly intuitive as we have shown that the
optimal bid is independent of the subjective belief about b¯. Attitudes towards
ambiguity are reflected in attitudes towards different distributions of b¯. Hence,
neither ambiguity tastes, nor beliefs about b¯ are predicted to have an impact
on the bidding decision.9
Nonlinear Probability Weighting
Another departure from expected utility theory concerns the way different
objectively known probabilities affect the decision making process. It is well
established in the psychological literature that subjects tend to put decision
8Ambiguity-averse (loving) attitude corresponds to a concave (convex) φ, neutrality to-
wards ambiguity is given by a linear φ as modeled above.
9The same logic applies to other models of ambiguity aversion. In particular, it can be
shown that it holds in the widely applied model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for any
finite beliefs about b¯. However, the analysis above is based on Klibanoff et al.’s model due
to its differentiability and tractability.
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weights on probabilities when taking decisions under uncertainty. They act
as if the probabilities over outcomes were transformed with some nonlinear
weighting function. This kind of nonlinear probability weighting has been
brought forward as an explanation for overbidding in first-price auctions by
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002) and Armantier and Treich (2009). In what
follows, we adapt the model used by Goeree et al. to account for ambiguity
tastes and beliefs and show that, in contrast to a model based on ambigu-
ity aversion alone, a model that incorporates subjective probability weighting
yields an optimal bid which is different in the ambiguous setting.
If the bidder knows that the bids of each of her competitors are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] and weights the probabilities of winning in a nonlinear
manner, the optimal bid solves
max
b
w(bN)u(x− b). (2.6)
Herein w(·) denotes the probability weighting function. The first-order condi-
tion for this problem can be written as
NbN−1w′(bN)u(x− b)− w(bN)u′(x− b) = 0
⇔NbN−1u(x− b)−
w(bN)
w′(bN)
u′(x− b) = 0. (2.7)
In case the distribution of the bids of the other bidders is ambiguous, the
optimal bid solves10
max
b
∫ ∞
−∞
φ
(
w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b)
)
dµ(b¯). (2.8)
In this case the first-order condition is∫ ∞
−∞
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))(NbN−1
b¯N
w′
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b)− w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u′(x− b)
)
dµ(b¯) = 0,
10Herein φ is defined as in the previous section.
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which is equivalent to
∫ ∞
−∞
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))
(
NbN−1u(x− b)−
w
(
bN
b¯N
)
b¯N
w′
(
bN
b¯N
) u′(x− b))dµ(b¯) = 0.
(2.9)
Substituting the solution to (2.6) in (2.9) suggests that whether or not the
optimal bid with and without ambiguity is the same depends on φ, w and µ.
Hence, unless w is linear, bids in both situations will not coincide.
By making some additional assumptions about the preferences under ambi-
guity and the form of w based on well established empirical evidence, we can
derive more precise predictions about the expected differences in bidding be-
havior. Firstly, in line with the general literature on behavior under ambiguity,
we assume ambiguity-averse bidders (see Camerer and Weber 1992). Secondly,
following the flavor of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s maximin model, where
the decision maker optimizes the worst possible outcome, we assume that un-
der ambiguity beliefs about b¯ are pessimistic.11 This general assumption is
supported by the observation that when tastes and beliefs are explicitly ac-
counted for, pessimistic beliefs are required in addition to ambiguity aversion
to explain the high ambiguity premium observed in insurance and investment
markets (Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant 2007).12 Thirdly, we assume that
the probability weighting function is shaped like an inverted ”‘S”’, concave for
low probabilities and convex for high probabilities.13 Probability weighting
functions with such shape overweight low probabilities and underweight high
probabilities. The following two-parameter functional form generates a family
of functions that includes all inverted ”‘S-shaped”’ functions:
w(p) = exp(−β(−ln(p))α), (2.10)
11With increasing ambiguity, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s model predicts deterioration of
the payoff via the worst possible (imaginable) case regardless of the parameter measuring
ambiguity attitudes. This can be interpreted as pessimistic beliefs.
12A somewhat less direct support is found in Heath and Tversky (1991), where a nega-
tive relationship is observed between subjective confidence about one’s ability to estimate
unknown probabilities and the reluctance to make ambiguous bets. An ambiguously-averse
bidder should care little about the level of ambiguity unless higher ambiguity is associated
with more pessimistic beliefs.
13In what follows, we will use the functional form axiomized by Prelec (1998). He also
shows that this functional form fits most of the empirical evidence on nonlinear probability
weighting.
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where α and β are positive parameters that determine the shape of the weight-
ing function. We can now state the following result.
Lemma 2.1 Let α 6= 1, bI := argmaxbw(b
N)u(x− b) and
v(b, b¯) := NbN−1u(x− b)−
w
(
bN
b¯N
)
b¯N
w′
(
bN
b¯N
) u′(x− b). (2.11)
The following holds true. If
∫ ∞
1
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))v(bI , b¯)dµ(b¯)
>
∫ 1
0
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))v(bI , b¯)dµ(b¯), (2.12)
the optimal bid when the bidder faces ambiguity is lower than without ambi-
guity, i.e.
bI > bA = argmax
b
∫ ∞
−∞
φ
(
w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b)
)
dµ(b¯).
Proof The proof is relegated to the appendix. 
The interpretation of Lemma 2.1 is straightforward: the larger b¯, the lower
the chance for the bidder to win ex-ante. When small probabilities are over-
weighted, the trade-off between a subjectively increased probability to win
and rents received upon winning is maximized at a lower objective probability.
Hence, if a bidder believes that the probability to face a rather high b¯ is large,
this overweighting causes her to bid less in the presence of ambiguity. Ambi-
guity preferences enter this reasoning through expression (2.12). First, if the
bidder is ambiguity-averse, φ is concave and hence φ′ is decreasing. It follows
that φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x − b)) is increasing in b¯. Therefore, she overweights larger
realizations of b¯ and (2.12) is more likely to hold true. Second, if the bidder has
pessimistic beliefs, µ(b¯) places more mass on less advantageous realizations of
b¯ and (2.12) is more likely to hold true. Note that regardless of the ambiguity
tastes, pessimistic beliefs about b¯ are required if (2.12) is to be fulfilled.
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Given the empirically motivated assumptions above, Lemma 2.1 yields the
following prediction about the bidding behavior in the two experimental treat-
ments.
Hypothesis 2.1 The optimal bid when the bidder faces ambiguity (NOINFO)
is lower than without ambiguity (INFO).
2.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we report the results for the treatments INFO and NOINFO
described above with upper bound of the uniform distribution equal to 100.
To circumvent potential robustness problems, which may arise through the
sensitivity of the relative bids to the height of the respective valuation, in
the following, we report analysis of median values for each participant. Fur-
thermore, in the questionnaire participants in the INFO treatment frequently
report that for valuations above 3/4 of the support they played ’safe’ by bid-
ding (at least) the maximum bid of the computerized opponents. To account
for potential bias in the data such behavior might cause, we provide separate
analysis for bids on valuations from the total support and on valuations, for
which no ’safe play’ is available.14
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the median relative bids at the beginning, at
the end, and throughout the whole experiment. The round number refers
to the respective independent repetition of the individual-choice task (e.g.
independent auction). Bids in the initial rounds are especially interesting,
since they were submitted before subjects in NOINFO could gather any (or
sufficient) information about the upper bound of the support of the computer
bids.
In line with results from standard experiments on bidding in first-price
auctions, with the exception of the last 5 rounds in the NOINFO treatment,
all of the medians reported in Table 2.1 are significantly different from the
risk-neutral best reply (p< 0.05 and lower for two-sided t-tests). Also in line
with experimental results in Gu¨th et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2007), relative
14Two of the participants in the INFO treatment systematically submitted bids above
their valuations despite the explicit note in the instructions that such bids may lead to
losses, which they will have to pay for. When their bids are excluded from the data on
suspicion of malicious behavior, the results remain qualitatively the same.
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Table 2.1: Median Relative Bids
All Rounds Round 1 Round 1-5 Round 16-20 Na
Valuations ≤ .75∗b All ≤ .75∗b All ≤ .75∗b All ≤ .75∗b All
INFO 0.871 0.853 0.815 0.813 0.852 0.833 0.886 0.866 64
(0.091) (0.068) (0.197) (0.187) (0.125) (0.012) (0.181) (0.084)
NOINFO 0.818 0.818 0.734 0.747 0.794 0.794 0.843 0.831 62
(0.098) (0.087) (0.178) (0.200) (0.112) (0.109) (0.159) (0.096)
p-valuesb 0.001 0.001 0.068 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.168 0.008
Legend: a Nr. of independent observations for all valuations; b two-sided t-test for between-treatment differences.
Note: Standard deviation across subjects in parenthesis.
bids in the NOINFO treatment are significantly lower than relative bids in
the INFO treatment.15 Especially in the first and in the first five rounds,
when respectively no and little information about the upper bound of the
rivals’ support is available, more overbidding (in absolute terms) is observed
in the INFO treatment. The differences are robust to the separate analysis for
valuations within the distribution of the computer bids, for which ’safe play’
is not possible.
Result 2.1 Participants’ bids are significantly lower in the NOINFO than in
the INFO treatment.
This result rejects the predictions of the expected utility theory and the
smooth ambiguity model in Section 2.3. To investigate the relative role of
ambiguity tastes and beliefs, let us consider the effect of repetition on bidding
behavior. Table 2.2, which presents the results of random effects estimates of
the bidding function clustered on the subject level, supports the results about
the effects of repetition presented in Table 2.1. In line with standard theo-
retical predictions, the intercept is not significantly different from zero. The
slope of the bidding function is significantly different from 0.75 (p < 0.001). In
the first five rounds, there is strong and significant negative effect of NOINFO
on the intercept. An effect of NOINFO on the slope of the bidding function
is present only in the model with valuations within the distribution of the
computer bids, where it is relatively small and only marginally significant.
Hence, between-treatment differences seem to be driven mainly by different
intercepts rather than different slopes of the bidding function. Furthermore,
15Differences in Gu¨th et al. are not significant but qualitatively in the same direction as
those reported here.
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between-treatment differences on the intercept remain marginally significant in
the next five rounds and then disappear, suggesting that bidding in the treat-
ments becomes more alike. The regression estimates, therefore, support the
observation in Table 2.1 that, especially in the initial rounds, bids in NOINFO
are significantly lower than those in INFO.
Table 2.2: The Effect of Repetition on Submitted Bids
Variable Valuations ≤ .75∗b¯ All valuations
Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value
Valuation 0.868 0.012 0.000 0.806 0.009 0.000
NOINFO -2.133 0.845 0.012 -2.922 0.948 0.002
Valuation*NOINFO -0.030 0.016 0.063 -0.006 0.014 0.674
Rounds 6-10 0.100 0.547 0.854 0.573 0.627 0.361
Rounds 11-15 0.020 0.663 0.976 0.561 0.645 0.385
Rounds 16-20 0.971 0.919 0.291 1.174 0.863 0.174
Rounds 6-10*NOINFO 1.910 0.984 0.052 1.899 1.039 0.068
Rounds 11-15*NOINFO 1.406 0.953 0.140 1.565 1.025 0.127
Rounds 16-20*NOINFO 0.819 1.128 0.468 0.823 1.153 0.475
Constant -0.550 0.710 0.438 1.098 0.771 0.154
Nr. of observations 1885 2520
Nr. clusters 126 126
Random Effects
R2 within 0.920 0.927
R2 between 0.594 0.701
R2 overal 0.899 0.912
Note: Robust random effects estimates clustered on the subject level.
The experimental results in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 suggest that bids in
the NOINFO treatment increase more rapidly than those in the INFO treat-
ment. Given that individual ambiguity tastes – i.e., φ’s form – remain constant
over time, (2.12) suggests that the different effects of repetition on the bidding
function can be ascribed to changes in the beliefs about b¯. Since b¯ is constant
over all 20 rounds, any feedback on winning or loosing (to a given computer-
ized bid) allows the participants to update their beliefs about it. The more
accurate these beliefs, the less differences between the treatments. The lower
bids in NOINFO, therefore, indicate that without any information about the
upper bound of the bids of their competitors, subjects tend to form pessimistic
beliefs – i.e., they place more mass on larger upper bounds. This increases the
share of bids, for which the winning probabilities are overweighted, leading to
lower subjectively optimal bids. Interestingly, in the very first round, when
no information about the upper bound of support of the computer bids is
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available, there is significant underbidding in the NOINFO treatment (t-test
p < 0.05). This suggests even stronger overestimation of disadvantageous b¯’s.
Note that our interpretation of the lower bids in the ambiguous environ-
ment differs from the one in Chen et al. (2007), where they are attributed to
ambiguity-loving attitudes. However, as the authors note, ambiguity-loving in
the strategic environment of an auction can have different interpretation from
ambiguity attitudes in individual-choice experiments.
2.5 Conclusion
This study contributes to an increasing experimental practice to study be-
havior in auctions in a highly controlled environment, which resolves issues
of equilibrium play and interpersonal preferences and allows us to focus on
the effect of a small environmental change on bidding behavior. In this we
demonstrate that ambiguity-averse bidders who form pessimistic beliefs about
their competition may in response decrease their bids.
Moreover, our findings add evidence to the importance of accounting for
nonlinear probability weighting when analyzing data from experimental auc-
tions. To our knowledge, only few studies on bidding behavior in first-price
auctions have explicitly controlled for participants’ beliefs about their proba-
bilities to win with a certain bid (see Armantier and Treich 2009; Kirchkamp
and Reiß 2011). Given that Armantier and Treich (2009) show that accounting
for nonlinear probability weighting can lead to different interpretation of the
experimental results, we hope that it will receive more attention in the future
when theories of bidding behavior are tested in the laboratory.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof Observe first that
w
(
bN
b¯N
)
b¯N
w′
(
bN
b¯N
) = −ln
(
bN
b¯N
)1−β
bN
αβ
.
It follows that v(b, b¯) is single-crossing from above in b and hence
∫∞
−∞
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x−
b))v(b, b¯)dµ(b¯) is single-crossing from above for all b > 0. Moreover,
−ln
(
bN
b¯N
)1−β
bN
αβ
is increasing in b¯ and hence v(b, b¯) is decreasing in b¯. Together with v(bI , 1) = 0
it follows that∫ ∞
1
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))v(bI , b¯)dµ(b¯)
>
∫ 1
0
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))v(bI , b¯)dµ(b¯)
⇒
∫ ∞
−∞
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))v(bI , b¯)dµ(b¯) < 0.
As
∫∞
−∞
φ′(w
(
bN
b¯N
)
u(x− b))v(b, b¯)dµ(b¯) is single-crossing from above, the opti-
mal bA must be smaller than bI . This completes the proof. 
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2.6.2 Additional Results
Table 2.3: OLS Estimates of Determinants of the Final Payoff
Variable (I) (II) (III)
NOINFO 0.397 0.388 1.056
Class in Game Theory 10.344* 4.34 4.688
NOINFO*Class in Game Theory -10.139 -3.673 -4.775
Avg. Valuation 0.424*** 0.482***
NOINFO*Avg. Valuation -0.003 -0.066
Additional Controlsa X
Intercept 8.242*** -13.134** -16.304***
N 126 126 126
F 1.43 12.4 5.28
R2 0.034 0.341 0.418
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; a Additional controls were gen-
der, student at the Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, self-reported
experience with economic experiments, and self-reported experience with
auctions.
2.6.3 Instructions
In the following the instructions for the INFO treatment are provided. It is
indicated where they differ for the NOINFO treatment. Welcome and thank
you for participating in this experiment! Please read these instructions care-
fully. We kindly ask you to refrain from talking to the other participants or
communicating with them in any other way. Please raise your hand if you have
any questions. The experimenter will then come to you and answer them. All
participants have received the same instructions.
General Information
In this experiment you will be able to earn money depending on your deci-
sions. During the experiment your profits will be calculated in Experimental
Currency Units (ECU). 9 ECUs are equivalent to 1 Euro. At the end of the
experiment your profits will be converted into Euros and paid out to you in
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addition to a 2.50 Euro show-up fee. Your decisions as well as your profits will
be treated confidentially: no other participant will be informed about them.
Game Structure
In this experiment you will be able to purchase a fictitious good in each of
20 auctions. With you three programmed robots submit bids, so that there
are four bidders (you and the three bidding robots) in every auction. If in an
auction you submit the highest bid, you will win the fictitious good and pay
the price you offered in return. If you do not submit the highest bid, you won’t
receive or pay anything.
What is the fictive good’s value?
The exact value of the fictitious good varies between auctions and bidders. At
the beginning of each auction, before you make your bid, you are informed
about your valuation, i.e., the amount in ECU you will receive in case you win
the auction. Your valuation is determined by chance and will be a number
with two decimal places, between 0.00 ECU and 100.00 ECU [NOINFO: and a
maximum number of ECU’s you do not know]. Every number is equally likely.
Before each new auction, your valuation will be determined by chance.
How high is my profit?
In case you have made the highest bid in the auction, you win the fictitious
good. Your profit is your valuation of the fictitious good in ECU minus your
bid. (If you win the auction with a bid which is higher than your valuation,
you will suffer losses. Possible losses will be set off against the 2.50 Euro show-
up fee. At the end of the experiment you will have to pay for any losses which
exceed your show-up fee.) If your bid is lower than the highest bid of the three
bidding robots in the auction, you do not receive any payoff for this auction. If
two or more bids are equal, the winner of the auction is determined by chance.
Your profits over all 20 auctions are cumulated at the end of the experiment,
converted according to the exchange rate above, and paid to you in addition
to the show-up fee.
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How do the three bidding robots bid?
In each auction there are four bidders – you and the three robots. The robots
are programmed to make a bid between 0.00 ECU and 75.00 ECU [NOINFO:
and a maximum number of ECU’s you do not know]. Every number is equally
likely. Before each new auction, the robots’ bids will be determined accord-
ing to this random principle, independently from one another and from your
valuation.
What feedback do I receive after the auction?
After each auction you will be informed whether or not you have won the
auction, the auction price (i.e., the highest bid) and your profit in this auction.
Final remarks
All auctions are relevant for your final payoff. Please raise your hand if you
have any questions.
25
Chapter 3
Favoritism in Auctions with
Risk-Averse Bidders
3.1 Introduction
In many situation a seller and an uninformed buyer, hereafter referred to as
“preferred”, can increase their joint surplus by making a mutually beneficial
pre-auction agreement that determines the rules of a subsequent auction, in
which the buyer competes with other buyers. The agreement will be such that
the rules of the subsequent auction will more accurately reflect the seller and
the preferred bidder’s joint opportunity costs from selling the good to one of
the other buyers, thus allowing them to avoid jointly unprofitable trades and
to extract more rents from the other buyers (Hua 2007). Burguet and Perry
(2009, hereafter BP09) study formally two such agreements of auctions with
favoritism. The first one allows the preferred bidder to match the highest rivals’
bid after the final bidding round is over – a so called “last call” or “right of
first refusal”.1 This competitive advantage increases the preferred bidder’s ex
ante surplus at the expense of the regular bidders and the seller. However, the
benefit she obtains exceeds the seller’s losses in revenue, thus leading to higher
joint surplus. The second agreement maximizes the expected joint surplus via
an optimal mechanism, such that the preferred bidder reports her valuation
to the seller who then awards the good via an auction with an optimal reserve
1Note that the term “right of first refusal” has a number of definitions and applications.
For some examples, see Walker (1999). Here, it will be used in the described auction context.
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price.
In a laboratory experiment I investigate the robustness of the predictions of
BP09’s formal analysis. Two bidders – one preferred and one regular – whose
independent valuations stem from a common uniform distribution, compete for
an indivisible good. Prior to the auction and before valuations have been pri-
vately learned, the preferred bidder has the opportunity to induce favoritism
by making a lump-sum payment to the seller. The regular bidder observes
whether or not the payment is made, but does not know its amount. If the
preferred bidder does not make the payment, both bidders compete in a stan-
dard first-price, sealed-bid auction. Otherwise, depending on the treatment,
one of the following auctions with favoritism is implemented. In the first treat-
ment, the regular bidder submits her bid and the preferred bidder has the right
to match it. In the second treatment, the preferred bidder reports her valua-
tion to the seller, who then awards the good to the regular bidder only if the
latter can match a reserve price that optimizes the seller’s and the preferred
bidder’s joint surplus.
The experimental results support BP09’s conjecture that both forms of fa-
voritism tend to increase the joint surplus of the seller and the preferred bidder.
They also suggest that although favoritism decreases the auction revenue, it
can benefit the seller when through the pre-auction agreement she can extract
(part of) the preferred bidder’s additional surplus. However, differences be-
tween the two forms of favoritism are observed that are not predicted by BP09’s
theoretical analysis with risk-neutral bidders. In particular, the auction with
the optimal reserve price does not extract more rents from the regular bidder
than the auction with the right of first refusal. Furthermore, favoritism with
the optimal mechanism has a stronger negative effect on the auction revenue
than favoritism with the right of first refusal. Thus, although the preferred
bidder’s payoff is higher in the first type of favoritism, the joint surplus is
not maximized under the optimal mechanism. Furthermore, relative to the
standard first price auction, the auction with the right of first refusal does not
bring about additional allocative inefficiencies. I demonstrate that accounting
for risk aversion and bounded rationality can organize these deviations from
the risk-neutral predictions.
One of the motivations for awarding a potential bidder the right of first
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refusal is the necessity to protect her ex ante investments. The right of first
refusal is, therefore, often given to commercial tenants to increase their incen-
tives to upgrade the property (Bikhchandani, Lippman and Ryan 2005), or
to investors in the form of pre-acquisition agreements (Hua 2007). Another
possible field of application could be in industries, where it is common practice
to conduct research and development of prototypes for new products in close
cooperation with one of the potential suppliers, but to award contracts for
serial production via a competitive process. In the research and development
stage, the outcome of a research project – its success as well as the properties
of the final procurement contract – is unknown. However, if the research part-
ner is promised the right of first refusal in the subsequent competitive process,
she might have greater incentives to invest in the research project, making its
success more likely.
This study is closely related to the literature on favoritism and corruption
with an exogenously determined preferred bidder. In both strands of the lit-
erature, prior to the auction one of the bidders is given the right to match
the highest rival bid and this is common knowledge. Under corruption, the
preferred bidder acquires her status in a pre-auction stage, where she bribes
a corrupt intermediary agent running the auction. Under favoritism, the pre-
ferred bidder receives the right of first refusal for free or against a payment to
the seller (Burguet and Perry 2009; Choi 2009; Hua 2007). In both cases, the
right of first refusal extracts additional rents from the non-preferred bidders
(Arozamena and Weinschelbaum 2009; Burguet and Perry 2009; Choi 2009).
Whether or not the seller benefits from granting the right of first refusal, de-
pends on her ability to collect these additional rents and on the way the right of
first refusal affects her revenue. In the context of corruption, only the interme-
diary agent can benefit from the additional rents. In the context of favoritism,
collecting the rents is usually not explicitly analyzed, with the exception of
Hua (2007) discussed below.
The effect of the right of first refusal on the auction revenue depends on
the distribution of the bidders’ valuations. If bidders are ex ante asymmetric,
then Burguet and Perry (2007) and Lee (2008) demonstrate that granting the
right of first refusal to the weaker bidder can sometimes improve the auction
revenue. However, if bidders are ex ante symmetric and the distribution of
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their valuations is regular, i.e., a bidder’s virtual valuation is increasing in her
true valuation, Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) and Burguet and Perry
(2009) show that the auction revenue deteriorates as a result of granting the
right of first refusal to one of the bidders. Hence, the seller has incentives to
grant the right of first refusal only if the rents she collects in the pre-auction
stage outweigh her losses in revenue.2
Regarding the optimality of the auction rules, Arozamena and Weinschel-
baum (2006) derive the properties of any mechanism that in a setting with
independent private values would maximize the joint surplus of the seller and
the preferred bidder. They demonstrate that no auction with the right of first
refusal fulfills these properties. Hua (2007) derives the optimal direct reve-
lation mechanism in a setting with one non-preferred bidder and a preferred
bidder who has financial constraints in the pre-auction stage. If the preferred
bidder is not financially restricted, Hua’s analysis applies to the two bidder
case which is experimentally analyzed here.
The experimental literature on favoritism and corruption in auctions with
an exogenously determined preferred bidder is rather scarce. To the best of
my knowledge, an experiment by Grosskopf and Roth (2009) on the effect of
the right of first refusal in (reversed) negotiations is the only experimental
study that remotely touches upon this topic. This paper fills this gap. It
also provides an instrument for determining the division of additional surplus
between the seller and the preferred bidder. Furthermore, it investigates the
robustness of the theoretical predictions to boundedly rational behavior. In
particular, the optimal mechanism in BP09 requires truthful value revelation
by the preferred bidder. However, there is well established experimental ev-
idence that not all incentive compatible mechanisms are capable of inducing
truthful value revelation in practice. For example, bidding behavior in the
strategically equivalent English and sealed-bid, second-price auctions usually
differs, so that only the English auction provides a robust mechanism for elic-
iting bidders’ valuations (see Kagel 1995, for a review of related literature).
Given that in private procurement firms often interact repeatedly, it is rea-
2There is also vast and less related literature on corruption in auctions, where the pre-
ferred bidder is endogenously determined – i.e., after valuations have been privately an-
nounced, bidders compete for the right of first refusal. The interested reader is referred to
Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2010) and the references therein.
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sonable to believe that suppliers, who wish to keep their negotiation power in
future interactions, would not be willing to disclose their true costs regardless
of the short-term incentive compatibility of any elicitation mechanism. The
laboratory experiment, therefore, challenges the robustness of the optimiza-
tion mechanism proposed by BP09 to (behaviorally driven) deviations from
equilibrium play.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews
BP09’s formal analysis. Section 3.3 describes the experimental design and
the subsequent Section 3.4 summarizes the theoretical predictions given the
particular experimental framework. The experimental results are presented in
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 attempts to explain the deviations between predicted
and observed behavior. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
BP09 analyze the effect of both mechanisms for favoritism studied here for
N risk-neutral suppliers competing for a contract in a reversed procurement
auction. In the following, I introduce the notation and review BP09’s main re-
sults in the context of a standard (selling) auction. Furthermore, using insights
from the standard auction literature, I derive the explicit payoff functions of all
parties under the optimal mechanism described below. Deviating from BP09,
I assume that the alternative to any form of favoritism is a standard first-price
sealed-bid auction.3
N bidders – one preferred (P ) and N − 1 regular, non-preferred (Rj, j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N − 1}) – bid for an indivisible good. Valuations are independently
drawn from a common distribution F (·), with continuous density f(·) and
support [v, v]. F (x)/f(x) is assumed to be an increasing function, s.t. the
inverse hazard rate function (1−F (x))/f(x) is decreasing and bounded.4 The
risk-neutral seller (S) does not have any outside value for the good and her
3In BP09 the optimal mechanism that maximizes the coalition’s surplus is compared to
an optimal auction that maximizes the payoff of the auctioneer alone. This deviation of the
experimental setting increases the comparability between the treatments without affecting
the general implications.
4For the analysis of the joint surplus, BP09 make an additional assumption about (1−
F (x))/f(x). However, a more general version of their result is found in Proposition 3
in Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009), where BP09’s result holds for any F (x)/f(x).
Hence, in the following, no additional assumptions are required.
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costs are normalized to zero. The following two games are studied.
Game 1: Favoritism with the Right of First Refusal
F (·) is common knowledge.
Stage 1 S and P negotiate a lump-sum payment from P to S and the rules
of the auction in Stage 3.
Stage 2 Valuations are privately announced. The auction rules in Stage 3
are publicly announced. The amount of the lump-sum payment, if
there is any, remains private knowledge of S and P.
Stage 3 (a) If S and P have reached an agreement in Stage 1, P has the
right of first refusal – i.e., the regular bidders submit their bids
simultaneously, P is informed about the highest price submitted by
them and offered to buy the good at this price. If P rejects the offer,
the regular bidder with the highest bid wins and pays her bid.
(b) If S and P have not reached an agreement in Stage 1, all bidders
compete in a standard first-price auction.
Game 2: Favoritism with an Optimal Mechanism
F (·) is common knowledge.
Stage 1 S and P negotiate a lump-sum payment from P to S and the rules
of the auction in Stage 3.
Stage 2.1 Valuations are privately announced. The auction rules in Stage 3
are publicly announced. The amount of the lump-sum payment, if
there is any, remains private knowledge of S and P.
Stage 2.2 (a) If S and P have reached an agreement in Stage 1, P reports her
valuation x̂ to the seller in exchange for a transfer T (x̂).
(b) If S and P have not reached an agreement in Stage 1, the game
proceeds to Stage 3 (b).
Stage 3 (a) If S and P have reached an agreement in Stage 1, the regular
bidders compete for the good in a first-price sealed-bid auction with
a commonly known reserve price r(x̂) that optimizes the joint surplus
of S and P. If none of the regular bidders’ bids is higher than or
equal to the reserve price, P receives the good and pays her reported
valuation x̂.
(b) If S and P have not reached an agreement in Stage 1, all bidders
compete in a standard first-price auction.
Denote with Πti(x) the expected payoff of agent i ∈ {P,Rj, S} with valua-
tion x ∈ F (·) under condition t, where t ∈ {FPA,ROFR,OM} indicates the
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auction rules in Stage 3. FPA indicates that bidders compete in a standard
first-price auction. ROFR indicates that an agreement has been reached in the
first game and P has the right of first refusal. OM indicates that an agreement
has been reached in the second game and the auction has a reserve price that
optimizes the joint surplus of S and P. Let EΠti(·) denote the respective ex
ante expected payoff before valuations are privately announced and β(x)t the
respective bidding strategy of a (regular) bidder with valuation x in an in-
creasing, symmetric equilibrium. Both games can be solved through backward
induction.
Proposition 3.1 In Stage 3, all bidders maximize their expected payoff given
their private and common knowledge. For N > 2 and a continuously differ-
entiable density function f(x), an increasing symmetric equilibrium exists in
every subgame, s.t.:
(i) the increasing bidding strategy of all bidders under FPA is given by
βFPA(x) =
1
F (x)N−1
∫ x
v
z(N − 1)F (z)N−2f(z) dz; (3.1)
(ii) under ROFR, P accepts the offer to buy the good at the highest price
offered by the regular bidders if her valuation is higher than this price,
and reject it otherwise, while the increasing bidding strategy of the reg-
ular bidders is such that, given a boundery condition βROFR(v) = v and
N > 2, it solves
(βROFR)′(x) =
H(βROFR(x))(N − 2)[x− βROFR(x)]
H(x)[H(βROFR(x))− (x− βROFR(x))]
, (3.2)
where H(x) = F (x)/f(x);
(iii) the increasing bidding strategy of the regular bidders under OM, when
the commonly known reserve price is r, equals
βOM(x) = r
F (r)N−2
F (x)N−2
+
1
F (x)N−2
∫ x
r
z(N − 2)F (z)N−3f(z) dz (3.3)
for x > r and 0 otherwise.
Proof (i) is a standard result in the auction literature found in Krishna
(2002, Ch. 2.3), for example. (ii) follows from the fact that P will ac-
cept the offer if her valuation is higher than the highest bid of the regular
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bidders, and will reject it otherwise.5 Hence, a regular bidder with valu-
ation x maximizes the expected payoff function ΠRj(β
ROFR(x), x) = [x −
βROFR(x)]F (βROFR(x))F (x)N−2. The condition in (iii) is equivalent to the
one in (5) in BP09. (iii) is a standard result in the auction literature found in
Krishna (2002, Ch. 2.5), for example. 
Note that for N = 2 the optimization problem for the regular bidders under
ROFR is dominance solvable. A solution is provided in Section 3.4.
Proposition 3.2 Under OM, given the regular bidders’ bidding strategy and
provided that the hazard rate function f(x)/(1 − F (x)) is monotonically in-
creasing, the optimal mechanism is such that, when P reports a valuation x̂,
(i) the reserve price in Stage 3 solves
r −
1− F (r)
f(r)
= x̂, (3.4)
(ii) while in Stage 2.2, S elicits P’s valuation by paying her an incentive
compatible transfer T (x̂) =
∫ x̂
v
F (r(z))N−1 dz.
Proof Under OM, S and P have agreed to form a coalition and sell the good
via a mechanism which maximizes their joint surplus. Hence, they act as one
agent, whose valuation for the good equals the surplus of trade between the
two parties, i.e., P’s valuation.6 The proof of (i) is found in Krishna (2002,
Ch. 2.5) or Myerson (1981). The proof of (ii) is equivalent to the proof of
Proposition 5 in BP09. 
Note that r(x) is independent of the number of regular bidders. Furthermore,
for regular distributions, i.e. when x− (1− (F (x))/f(x) is an increasing func-
tion, r(x) is also an increasing function. Also note that the transfer is not
conditional on P actually winning the good.7 Due to the incentive compatibil-
ity of the elicitation mechanism, it follows that x̂ = x and r(x̂) = r(x).
5Note that P has no incentives to submit a positive bid, since any bid above the highest
bid of the regular bidders would increase the price she has to pay.
6Remember that S does not have any value for the good.
7It has been suggested to make the elicitation mechanism such that the transfer P receives
is conditional on her winning the good. However, it can be shown that such a transfer is not
incentive compatible when there are two bidders and P is risk-averse. Since risk aversion is
found to organize the experimental results better than risk neutrality, such a transfer would
not be part of a feasible mechanism.
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Proposition 3.3 The respective ex ante expected payoff of a regular bidder
Rj, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1} in Stage 1, depending on the auction rules in Stage
3, is given by
(i)
EΠFPARj (·) =
∫ v
v
(1− F (z))F (z)N−1 dz, (3.5)
(ii)
EΠROFRRj (·) =
∫ v
v
(1− F (z))F (z)N−2F (βROFR(z)) dz, (3.6)
and
(iii)
EΠOMRj (·) =
∫ v
r(v)
f(x)F (x)N−2
(
xF (r−1(x))
−
∫ r−1(x)
v
βOM(x, r(z))f(z) dz
)
dx. (3.7)
where r(x) is characterized by equation (3.4).
Proof The payoffs in (i) and (ii) are equivalent to (2) and (8) in BP09, re-
spectively. The proof of (iii) is relegated to the appendix. 
Proposition 3.4 The respective ex ante expected payoff of the preferred bid-
der in Stage 1, depending on the auction rules in Stage 3 and barring any
lump-sum payments to S, is given by
(i)
EΠFPAP (·) =
∫ v
v
(1− F (z))F (z)N−1 dz, (3.8)
(ii)
EΠROFRP (·) =
∫ βROFR(v)
v
(1− F (z))F [(βROFR)−1(z)]N−1 dz
+
∫ v
βROFR(v)
(1− F (z)) dz, (3.9)
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and
(iii)
EΠOMP (·) =
∫ v
v
f(x)
∫ x
v
F (r(z))N−1 dz dx =
∫ v
v
(1− F (z))F (r(z))N−1 dz.
(3.10)
Proof (i) is equivalent to (i) in Proposition 3.3. (ii) is equivalent to (9)
in BP09 and (iii) follows from the fact the P’s ex ante expected payoff is
determined by the expected value of the elicitation transfer for all possible
realizations of her valuation. 
Proposition 3.5 The respective ex ante expected revenue of the seller in
Stage 1, depending on the auction rules in Stage 3 and barring any lump-sum
payments from P, is given by
(i)
EΠFPAS (·) = N
∫ v
v
(1− F (z))z(N − 1)F (z)N−2f(z) dz, (3.11)
(ii)
EΠROFRS (·) = (N − 1)
∫ v
v
f(x)βROFR(x)F (x)N−2 dx, (3.12)
and
(iii)
ΠOMS (·) =
∫ v
v
f(x)
[
(N − 1)
(
r(x)(1− F (r(x)))F (r(x))N−2
+
∫ v
r(x)
z(1− F (z))(N − 2)F (z)N−3f(z) dz
)
+ F (r(x))N−1x−
∫ x
v
F (r(z))N−1 dz
]
dx. (3.13)
Proof (i) is a standard result for first-price sealed-bid auctions with N bid-
ders (see Krishna 2002, Ch. 2.4, for example). (ii) is equivalent to (11) in
BP09. And (iii) uses the results for the expected auction revenue in first-price
auctions with reserve prices (see Krishna 2002, Ch. 2.5), while accounting for
the randomness of r(x) and for the elicitation transfer T (x). 
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Remember that in a standard first-price auction, in an increasing, symmetric
equilibrium, the expected payoff of any bidder i ∈ {Rj, P} with valuation x is
given by8
ΠFPAi (x) = F (x)
N−1(x− βFPA(x)). (3.14)
Under OM, the expected payoff of a regular bidder with valuation x before the
reserve price r(z) is made common knowledge, can be expressed as
ΠOMRj (x, r(z)) = F (x)
N−2F (r−1(x))(x− E[βOM(x, r(z))|x > r(z)]).
(3.15)
Note that r(x) > x, i.e. r−1(x) < x, and βFPA(x) < βOM(x, r) for any
x ∈ F (·) \ {v} and r > v. Using the results from the propositions above
and from (3.14) and (3.15), it follows that EΠROFRP > EΠ
FPA
i > EΠ
ROFR
Rj
and ΠOMP (·) > Π
FPA
i (·) > Π
OM
C (·), where i ∈ {P,Rj}. It is obvious that
EΠROFRS < EΠ
FPA
S . The comparison of the auction revenue under FPA and
OM is not that straightforward, but in section 3.4 it is shown to deteriorate
under OM when F (x) ∼ U [v, v]. Hence, based on the outcome of the auction
alone, both forms of favoritism redistribute rents away from the seller and
the regular bidders to the preferred bidder. Arozamena and Weinschelbaum
(2009) demonstrate that ROFR increases the joint surplus of the seller and the
preferred bidder. Given its construction, OM also increases the joint surplus.
Hence, the seller would have incentives to run an auction with any of the two
forms of favoritism only if through the lump-sum payment in the negotiation
Stage 1 she manages to extract a part of this surplus that is sufficient to
outweigh her losses in revenue. BP09 note that, as long as the preferred
bidder does not face any budget or financial constraints, any redistribution
of additional surplus in the negotiation stage is individually rational. Hence,
provided that there are no financial constraints, the height of the lump-sum
payment in Stage 1, and with it the seller’s incentives to run an auction with
favoritism depend on the bargaining power of the seller and the preferred
bidder. Details are discussed in Section 3.4.
8See Krishna (2002, Ch. 2), for example.
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3.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
In a laboratory experiment, I study the effect of favoritism in a first-price
sealed-bid auction with two bidders competing for a nondivisible good. One
of the bidders is exogenously determined to be preferred. Prior to the auction
and before the bidders learn their valuations, the preferred bidder can influence
the rules of the subsequent competition by submitting a lump-sum payment to
the seller. Her willingness-to-pay to avoid competing in a standard first-price
auction is elicited via the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-method (Becker, DeG-
root and Marschak 1964), where the actual amount of the lump-sum payment
is randomly determined. If the reported willingness-to-pay is higher than the
random amount, the preferred bidder pays the random amount and both bid-
ders compete in an auction with favoritism. Otherwise, both bidders compete
in a standard first-price sealed-bid auction. Both bidders know that one of
them is preferred and the manner in which they will compete as soon as it
has been determined. Only the preferred bidder knows her willingness-to-pay
and the randomly determined lump-sum payment for avoiding the first-price
auction.
In the first treatment, in the following referred to as T-ROFR, in the auc-
tion with favoritism the non-preferred bidder submits her bid and the preferred
bidder is allowed to match it. If she can do that, she wins the auction and pays
the bid of the non-preferred bidder. Otherwise, the non-preferred bidder wins
and pays her own bid. In the other treatment, in the following referred to as
T-OM, in the auction with favoritism the preferred bidder reports a valuation
to the auctioneer in exchange for an incentive compatible transfer as defined
in Section 3.2. The non-preferred bidder is then offered to purchase the good
at a (reserve) price that depends on the reported valuation. If she accepts that
price, she wins the auction and pays the reserve price. If she does not accept
it, the preferred bidder wins the auction and pays her reported valuation.9
Figures 3.1 and 3.2, which were also included in the instructions, depict the
possible course of one round in the T-ROFR and T-OM treatment, respec-
tively. In T-OM participants were also presented with a table that informed
9Note that when there are only two bidders, the selling mechanism with favoritism is
no longer an auction in its true sense but a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism. However, this
deviation does not affect the theoretical predictions. Therefore, the labels are chosen for
consistency with the general literature.
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them about the transfer to the preferred bidder and the reservation price for
the competing bidder resulting from different valuations reported by the pre-
ferred bidder. The experiment was neutrally framed – the auctions with fa-
voritism were referred to as “sequential play” and the first-price auctions as
“simultaneous play”.
The valuations of both bidders were random numbers with up to one digit
after the decimal point, i.i.d. on [0, 100].10 They were randomly drawn for
each round. Both bidders were privately informed about their own valuation
after the game type – sequential or simultaneous – had been determined. The
random lump-sum payment for the auction with favoritism was framed as a
price for sequential play and was drawn from a commonly known uniform
distribution with support [−10, 25]. The negative values in the support allow
me to investigate whether some participants might actually request money in
order to play sequentially.11 Also, the average expected lump-sum payment
was somewhat lower than the lump-sum payment, which would make a seller
indifferent between a standard first-price auction and the respective auction
with favoritism when bidders are risk-neutral, but it ensured that a sufficient
number of observations of auctions with favoritism could be gathered.
Upon entering the lab, participants were randomly assigned to a computer
terminal. They received written instructions and were encouraged to ask ques-
tions in case of doubt. Questions were privately answered. The role of the
preferred bidder was randomly assigned and kept throughout the experiment.
In each round participants were randomly matched to a participant with a
different role.12 At the end of each round, feedback on the auction price and
10The distribution of the valuations is thus not truly continuous but this is a common and
unavoidable problem in the majority of literature on experimental auctions.
11Rational players do not have any incentives to report negative willingness-to-pay. How-
ever, humans are known to care for their relative payoffs in comparison to others and to
dislike large positive as well as large negative discrepancies (see Bolton and Ockenfels 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt 1999, 2006, and the references therein). Hence, if participants have
extreme fairness preferences, they might be unwilling to compete sequentially, as sequen-
tial play increases disproportionately the expected payoff of the preferred bidder relative
to the one of the regular bidder. In the 1,800 individual decisions per treatment, negative
willingness-to-pay is observed only rarely. In T-ROFR it is driven mainly by three par-
ticipants and observed in 6.7% of the cases. In T-OM it is driven by one participant and
observed in 0.5% of the cases.
12In fact, participants were separated into groups of three preferred and three non-
preferred bidders. In each round they were randomly re-matched to a bidder with a different
role within the respective group. The instructions provided information only about the fact
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Figure 3.1: The Course of One Round in T-ROFR
that in every round one’s partner was randomly determined.
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Figure 3.2: The Course of One Round in T-OM
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one’s own payoff was provided in the first-price auctions and on one’s price and
one’s own payoff in the auctions with favoritism. The final payoff was cumu-
lated over a random half of the 60 rounds determined by the throw of a dice.
At the beginning of each half, participants received new initial endowments.
Instructions are available in the appendix.
In total, 120 students at the University of Cologne with prior experience in
economic experiments participated in four sessions – two for each treatment
– conducted in November 2011 in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Ex-
periments. Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and the
experiment was programmed and conducted in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). One
session lasted 1.5 - 2 hours. The average earnings were 17.17 EUR in T-ROFR
and 20.73 EUR in T-OM, including a 2.50 EUR show-up fee.
3.4 Parametrization and Theoretical Predic-
tions
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the theoretical values for the ex ante expected
payoffs and the allocative efficiency when there are two bidders, whose valua-
tions stem from a continuous uniform distribution with support [v, v] = [0, 100].
Note that the calculation of the expected payoffs disregards any lump-sum pay-
ments in the negotiation stage.
With some abuse of notation let β(·) denote the bidding function in the
respective condition. The results, barring predictions about βROFR(x) and the
efficiency of allocation, follow directly from the analysis in Section 3.2 when
N = 2 and F ∼ U [v, v] is assumed. From Proposition 1 in Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum (2009), which states that the optimal bidding strategy of the
regular bidders does not change in response to the existence of a preferred
bidder as long as F (x)/f(x) is a linear function (and for F (x) ∼ U(·) this is
obviously the case), it follows that
βROFR(x) = βFPA(x) = (x+ v)/2 = (x− v)/2 + v.
The intuition behind this result is that in both cases the optimal bid is condi-
tional on the (regular) bidder having the highest valuation. She then submits
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a bid equal to the expected second highest valuation, which is the same in
both cases.
The derivation of the predictions for the allocative efficiency is relatively
straightforward. Let θt, t ∈ {FPA,ROFR,OM}, denote the expected effi-
ciency under the respective condition and pi(Ω) the probability of an event Ω
occurring. Under the symmetric equilibrium of the FPA the bidder with the
highest valuation wins, i.e., θFPA = 1. ROFR and OM lead to inefficient allo-
cation whenever the preferred bidder wins despite having the lower valuation.
When the preferred bidder’s valuation equals xP , the probability that she
non-deservingly wins and ROFR leads to inefficient allocation is given by
pi(ROFR inefficient, xP ) =
{
pi(xP < z) for xP ≥ β
ROFR(v)
pi(βROFR(z) < xP < z) for xP < β
ROFR(v)
where Z is the regular bidder’s random valuation and βROFR(v) = (v + v)/2
is her maximum possible bid, above which the preferred bidder always wins.
Accounting for the uniform distribution gives pi(xP ≥ β
ROFR(v)) = pi(xP <
βROFR(v)) = 0.5 and the following expected allocative efficiency:13
θROFR = 1− pi(ROFR inefficient, xP )
= 1−
(
0.5
∫ v
v
F (z)f(z) dz + 0.5
∫ v
v
(F (z)− F (βROFR(z)))f(z) dz
)
= 1−
(
0.5
1
2
F (z)2
∣∣∣v
v
+ 0.5
1
4
F (z)2
∣∣∣v
v
)
= 1−
3
8
= 0.625. (3.16)
Now assume that the regular bidder’s valuation is xR and P’s valuation is the
random variable Z. The probability that the preferred bidder non-deservingly
wins and OM leads to an inefficient allocation is given by
pi(OM inefficient, xR) =
{
pi(z < xR) for xR < r(v)
pi(z < xR < r(z)) for xR ≥ r(v)
13The calculations in (3.16) use that F (βROFR(z)) = (z−v)/2+v−vv−v = F (z)/2.
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Accounting for the uniform distribution gives r(v) = (v + v)/2, so that
pi(xR < r(v)) = pi(xR ≥ r(v)) = 0.5. The resulting ex ante allocative efficiency
then equals14
θOM = 1− pi(OM inefficient, xR)
= 1−
(
0.5
∫ v
v
(1− F (z))f(z) dz + 0.5
∫ v
v
(F (r(z))− F (z))f(z) dz
)
= 1−
(
0.5F (z)
∣∣∣v
v
− 0.5
1
2
F (z)2
∣∣∣v
v
+ 0.5
1
2
F (z)
∣∣∣v
v
− 0.5
1
4
F (z)2
∣∣∣v
v
)
= 1−
3
8
= 0.625. (3.17)
Note that when valuations are uniformly distributed, both forms of favoritism
lead to the same expected allocative efficiency. The optimal mechanism is
thus predicted to allow the coalition to maximize the rents extracted from the
non-preferred bidder, without causing additional deadweight losses.
Table 3.1 and the above analysis give the following predictions. Note that
these predictions do not consider any lump-sum payments in the negotiation
stage, which are discussed below.
Hypothesis 3.1 (Payoff Regular Bidder) The expected payoff of the reg-
ular bidder is lowest under OM, followed by ROFR, and then FPA.
Hypothesis 3.2 (Payoff Preferred Bidder) The expected payoff of the pre-
ferred bidder is highest under OM, followed by ROFR, and then FPA.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Auction Revenue) The expected auction revenue (elici-
tation payment under OM considered) is lower under any of the auctions with
favoritism than under the standard first-price auction. It is not significantly
different between OM and ROFR.
Hypothesis 3.4 (Joint Payoff) The expected joint payoff of the preferred
bidder and the seller is highest under OM, followed by ROFR, and then FPA.
Hypothesis 3.5 (Allocative Efficiency) The expected allocative efficiency
is lower under any of the auctions with favoritism than under the standard
first-price auction. It is not significantly different between OM and ROFR.
14The calculations in (3.17) use that F (r(z)) = F ((z + v)/2) = (z − v)/2 + (v − v)/2 =
1/2 + F (z)/2.
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The intuition behind these predictions is the following. In the FPA, a bid-
der wins the auction if and only if she has the highest valuation. Under any
mechanism with favoritism, the regular bidder can loose the auction despite
having the higher valuation. This leads to lower efficiency in the auctions with
favoritism (Hypothesis 3.5) and to redistribution of rents away from the reg-
ular bidder to the preferred bidder. Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.4 follow
from the fact that OM is designed to maximize this rent extraction. Favoritism
affects the expected payoffs of the seller and the preferred bidder in opposite di-
rections. As the preferred bidder receives the good with higher probability, her
ex ante expected payoff is higher in the auctions with favoritism. It is highest
under OM where she receives the total additional surplus extracted from the
competing bidder as informational rents (Hypothesis 3.2). Favoritism reduces
the expected auction revenue. Under FPA it equals the bid corresponding to
the highest valuation. Under ROFR it equals the bid of the regular bidder,
whose bid is not affected by the existence of favoritism and who may not have
the highest valuation. Hence, the expected auction revenue is lower under
ROFR than under FPA. Since all of the additional rents under OM are used
to elicit the preferred bidder’s valuation, the auction revenue is the same under
both forms of favoritism (Hypothesis 3.3).
The above analysis of the expected payoffs disregards any lump-sum pay-
ments by the preferred bidder in Stage 1. In line with the general literature on
favoritism, it finds that when the seller’s payoff is determined by the auction
revenue alone, the seller does not have any incentives to run an auction with
favoritism. However, if the seller can extract (part of) the preferred bidder’s
additional surplus arising from favoritism, her incentives to grant any form of
favoritism depend on the total payoff she receives from running the auction.
The realized distribution of surplus in the experiment is an artefact of the
experimental design, thus making a direct comparison between the seller’s
payoff under the first-price auction and her payoff under any of the auctions
with favoritism not very insightful. As noted above, provided that the preferred
bidder does not face any financial constraints, the distribution in practice will
depend on the bargaining power of the negotiating parties. In the following,
it is assumed that in Stage 1 the seller has the bargaining power. Given the
symmetric information structure in Stage 1, she makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
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to the preferred bidder that extracts the latter’s maximum willingness-to-pay
for the auction with favoritism, who then accepts this offer. The preferred
bidder’s maximum willingness-to-pay will be such that she becomes indifferent
between paying this amount and receiving the expected payoff under an auction
with favoritism on the one hand, and not paying this amount and receiving
the expected payoff under the first-price auction on the other. The following
prediction about the maximum lump-sum payment the preferred bidder would
accept in the negotiation stage is a corollary of Hypothesis 3.2.
Hypothesis 3.6 (Maximum Willingness-To-Pay) The maximum
willingness-to-pay by a preferred bidder to avoid the standard first-price auc-
tion is higher in T-OM than in T-ROFR.
As the seller’s payoff equals the sum of her auction revenue and the rents
she extracts from the preferred bidder in the negotiation stage, the following
prediction about the maximum achievable payoff a seller who has the bargain-
ing power and extracts the preferred bidder’s maximum willingness-to-pay in
Stage 1 is a corollary of Hypotheses 3.3 and 3.6.
Hypothesis 3.7 (Achievable Payoff Seller) If the seller can extract the
preferred bidder’s total willingness-to-pay for avoiding the first-price auction,
her payoff is highest under OM, followed by ROFR, and then FPA.
3.5 Experimental Results
This section presents the experimental results. The experimental design
allows for between-subject comparison of T-ROFR and T-OM and within-
subject comparison of any of the forms of favoritism and the FPA. With ten
independent observations per treatment, I run exact non-parametric, two-sided
tests. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test (WSR) compares the distributions of
observed with predicted values and paired data within one treatment. The
Mann-Whitney U-test (MWU) is used for between-treatment comparisons.
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Table 3.2 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics over all 60 rounds,
together with within- and between-treatment comparisons for all hypotheses
except for Hypothesis 3.6. Except for the joint payoff in T-OM and the auction
revenue under OM, all empirical values reported in Table 3.2 are significantly
different from the theoretically predicted ones in Table 3.1 (pWSR < 0.05).
15
In line with Hypothesis 3.2, the preferred bidder benefits from both forms
of favoritism. She does significantly more so in T-OM than in T-ROFR, where
the price she pays under the auction with favoritism is determined by risk-
averse regular bidders, who overbid substantially (see Section 3.6).
12,50 12,74
16,67
17,67
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
W
ill
in
g
n
e
s
s
 
T
o
 
P
a
y
!f
o
r!
S
e
q
u
e
n
ti
a
l!
P
la
y
ROFR OM
Theoretical Observed
Figure 3.3: Average Willingness-To-Pay for an Auction with
Favoritism (No Overbidders)
Figure 3.3 depicts the average willingness-to-pay reported by the preferred
bidders in both treatments.16 In line with Hypothesis 3.6 and the empiri-
cally observed differences between the preferred bidder’s payoff in auctions
with and without favoritism, subjects in T-OM report significantly higher
15For the variables reported in Table 3.2, significant differences between the first 30 and
the last 30 rounds are observed only for the T-OM treatment where the payoff of the pre-
ferred bidder under OM increases significantly from 30.31 ECU (SD=3.20) to 33.23 ECU
(SD=2.28) and the respective joint surplus increases from 55.80 ECU (SD=3.61) to 58.65
ECU (SD=2.33). As shown in the appendix, these differences are the result of more truthful
valuation reports after restart.
16Figure 3.3 excludes data with values higher than 25 ECU, since neither the probability
to compete in an auction with favoritism nor the possible lump-sum payment are affected by
such announcements. Including this data and capping the willingness-to-pay at 25 ECU gives
average willingness-to-pay of 14.03 ECU (SD=4.88) in T-ROFR and 19.08 ECU (SD=3.21)
in T-OM. Hence, the qualitative results remain the same.
48
willingness-to-pay to avoid the first-price auctions than their counterparts in
T-ROFR (pMWU = 0.043). Both values are not significantly different from
the theoretical maximum willingness-to-pay of a risk-neutral preferred bid-
der, which equals 12.5 in T-ROFR and 16.66 in T-OM (pROFRWSR = 0.084 and
pOMWSR = 0.375).
The rest of the theoretical predictions enjoy only partial support. Possi-
ble reasons for the observed deviations are discussed in Section 3.6. While
the payoff of the regular bidder is significantly lower under both forms of fa-
voritism in comparison to her payoff under FPA, OM does not lead to higher
rent extraction than ROFR as was predicted in Hypothesis 3.1. Furthermore,
the experimental results do not support the prediction that the joint surplus
of the preferred bidder and the seller is increased by both forms of favoritism
and maximized under OM (Hypothesis 3.4). The average joint surplus under
OM is marginally higher than the respective joint surplus under FPA. How-
ever, it is also marginally lower than the average joint surplus under ROFR.
This provides additional support for the observation that OM is incapable of
optimizing rent extraction from the regular bidder.
When the seller does not receive any lump-sum payment from the preferred
bidder in the negotiation stage, then her payoff is determined only by the
auction revenue. In line with Hypothesis 3.3 and with the general literature
on favoritism (see McAdams and Schwarz 2007, for example), the direct effect
of this unconditional favoritism on the seller’s payoff is negative. However,
contrary to the theoretical predictions, the negative effect is higher in T-OM
than in T-ROFR. Furthermore, assuming that in the negotiation stage the
seller has the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
preferred bidder, such that the lump-sum payment required in exchange for
the auction for favoritism extracts all of the preferred bidder’s willingness-
to-pay, the seller’s payoff remains higher under ROFR than under OM. This
result shows that under OM the rents extracted from the regular bidder are
insufficient to outweigh the losses in revenue. Hence, contrary to Hypothesis
3.7, favoritism can benefit the seller only if it is in the form of a ROFR, but
not a OM.
Finally, the experimental results suggest that, contrary to Hypothesis 3.5,
favoritism does not necessarily impair the allocative efficiency of the auction.
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This is due to the first-price auction not being perfectly efficient. Hence, a
seller would prefer favoritism with ROFR over favoritism with OM out of both
– payoff-maximizing and allocative efficiency concerns.
3.6 Discussion
This section discusses two complementary explanations for the disparities
between the theoretical predictions and the experimental results. In fact, the
theoretical analysis in Section 3.2 is based on a couple of assumptions, which
are not fulfilled in the experimental laboratory. It is demonstrated that the
experimental results can be organized, firstly, by abandoning the assumption
of risk-neutral bidders and, secondly, by allowing the preferred bidders to be
boundedly rational and not reveal their true valuation under OM. In particu-
lar, heterogenous risk-aversion organizes the ranking of the observed auction
revenue and the allocative efficiency, while the preferred bidder’s deviations
from the optimal reporting strategy under OM explain the lack of additional
rent extraction and the relatively low joint surplus under OM.
Risk-neutral (regular) bidders should submit bids equal to half of their
valuations under FPA (and ROFR). Table 3.3 presents fixed effects estimates
for the bidding functions of the preferred bidder (I) and the regular bidder (II)
under FPA, and the regular bidder under FPA and ROFR (III). The estimates
are clustered on the observation level, with robust error terms and controls for
the effect of repetition. The baseline is the first-round bidding function under
FPA. Treatment effects are accounted for through full interaction effects.17 In
line with the theoretical predictions, the intercepts over all models are not
significantly different from 0 and the presence of favoritism does not affect the
bid of the regular bidder. However, contrary to the theoretical predictions and
in line with the experimental literature on first-price auctions, the slope of the
bidding function is significantly different from 0.5 across all models.
It is well established that risk aversion is one of the reasons for such over-
bidding.18 As shown in the appendix section, risk aversion alters behavior
17Estimating the same models with random effects shows that there is no significant
treatment effect on the intercept.
18There is a large body of literature discussing the relative importance of risk aversion
in explaining bidding behavior in first-price auctions. For an excellent if somewhat dated
overview, see Kagel (1995). Recent developments have provided a number of alternative
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Table 3.3: Fixed Effects Estimates for the Bidding Functions
under FPA and ROFR
Variable/Model (I) (II) (III)
Valuation 0.633*** 0.712*** 0.706***
T-OM∗Valuation 0.116** -0.039
ROFR 0.028
ROFR ∗Valuation 0.027
Round 0.031 0.039 0.036
T-OM∗Round -0.088* -0.111*
ROFR∗Round -0.001
Constant -0.918 0.819 0.008
N 879 879 1800
Nr. of clusters 20 20 10
R2 between 0.703 0.524 0.269
R2 within 0.895 0.844 0.854
R2 overall 0.845 0.791 0.805
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; (I) preferred
bidder under FPA; (II) regular bidder under FPA; (III)
regular bidder under FPA and ROFR.
under FPA and ROFR, but does not change the predictions of the OM model.
In particular, when bidders are risk-averse, the optimal bids under FPA and
ROFR increase, whereas a risk-averse preferred bidder should continue to re-
port her true valuation under OM (see below). As a result, the probability
that under ROFR a preferred bidder wins the auction despite having the lower
valuation decreases, while the price she pays increases. This implies that risk
aversion reinforces the predictions in Hypothesis 3.2, namely that the payoff
of the preferred bidder is highest under OM, followed by ROFR, and then by
FPA, and decreases the negative effect of favoritism on the allocative efficiency
under ROFR, but not under OM.
Corollary 3.1 When bidders are risk-averse, the allocative efficiency under
OM is lower than the allocative efficiency under ROFR.
explanations for the frequently observed overbidding (see Andreoni, Che and Kim 2007;
Armantier and Treich 2009; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2007; Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay
2007, for examples of alternative behavioral explanations, such as spite, regret, and non-
linear probability weighting). However, they usually complement risk aversion and cannot
eliminate it as an explanatory variable.
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From the perspective of the seller, risk aversion leads to a higher winning
bid under FPA and a higher regular bidder’s bid under ROFR. Behavior and
revenue remain the same under OM. As a result, the expected auction revenue
is no longer equal under both forms of favoritism.
Corollary 3.2 When bidders are risk-averse, the expected auction revenue is
lowest under OM, followed by ROFR, and then by FPA.
The predictions of both corollaries are in line with the experimental results
in Table 3.2. Given that risk aversion affects the preferred bidder’s payoff
and the auction revenue in an opposite manner, its impact on the achievable
payoff of the seller and the joint surplus of the seller and the preferred bidder
is ambiguous.
Note that the corollaries do not require any assumptions about the indi-
vidual levels of risk aversion. If heterogeneity of risk preferences is accounted
for, then the bidding functions under FPA are no longer symmetric. Thus, the
bidder with the lower valuation can win the auction with a positive probability,
suggesting that the expected allocative efficiency of the FPA is no longer equal
to 1. Depending on the extent to which heterogeneous risk preferences cause
the allocative efficiency under FPA to decline, ROFR does not necessarily
harm the allocative efficiency as predicted in Hypothesis 3.5.19
So far we could establish that accounting for risk aversion organizes the ex-
perimental results concerning the auction revenue and the allocative efficiency.
However, it is still puzzling that OM does not maximize rent extraction from
the regular bidder and the preferred bidder’s and the seller’s joint surplus.
Figure 3.4, which depicts the preferred bidder’s reported valuation in relation
to their true one, throws some light on the reasons behind the inability of OM
to maximize the coalition’s surplus.
The predictions of the optimal mechanism assume that the preferred bidder
truthfully reports her valuation in Stage 2.2 of the second game. In the ap-
pendix, it is demonstrated that the elicitation mechanism is such that even a
19For example, assume that the preferred bidder is risk-neutral and has the higher valu-
ation. Then allocation under ROFR would be efficient for any level of risk-aversion of the
regular bidder. However, when the regular bidder has a sufficiently high valuation (which
is lower than the one of the preferred bidder) and is sufficiently risk-averse, then her bid in
the FPA would be higher than the preferred bidder’s bid in the FPA, leading to inefficient
allocation.
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Figure 3.4: Reported Valuations by the Preferred Bidder in
T-OM
risk-averse preferred bidder should report her true valuation. The frequent and
large deviations from the 45 degree line indicate that she only rarely reports
a valuation which is near her true value. The deviation of the reported from
the true valuation does not exceed 1 ECU in only 8.2% of the cases. More-
over, the absolute deviation exceeds 5 ECU in more than 70% of the cases.
The reported valuation is on average 4.87 ECU (SD=4.45) lower than the true
valuation, which suggests that there is a general tendency to underreport.20
As Table 3.4 and 3.5 in the appendix show, misreporting does not pay off and
therefore decreases over time. Nonetheless, in the last ten rounds, around 65%
of preferred bidders still misreport by more than 5 ECU. Hence, although sub-
jects were provided with a table that allowed them to identify truthful value
revelation as an optimal strategy, the elicitation mechanism was incapable of
inducing truth-telling. Given that the optimization properties of OM seem to
be highly dependent on the (in)ability of the elicitation mechanism to induce
truthful report revelation by boundedly rational agents, its feasibility cannot
be supported.
Given that lack of truthful value revelation is one of the drivers behind
20Note that the results may be driven by a preference for round numbers, which is a
phenomenon commonly reported in the psychological and financial markets literature (see
?, for example). In fact, while about 10.5% of the true valuations can be rounded to a
number which is a multiple of 10, 66.9% of the reported valuations are numbers which are
a multiple of 10.
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OM’s relatively bad performance, it may also be useful to analyze how ROFR
compares to an optimal mechanism where there are no informational asym-
metries between the seller and the preferred bidder in Stage 2. This would be
the case, for example, if the seller and the preferred bidder were members of
a corporate enterprize that needs to make a make-or-buy decision. When the
experimental results for ROFR are compared to the theoretical predictions for
OM, the qualitative results remain the same – under ROFR the payoff of the
preferred bidder is significantly lower than 33.33 ECU (pWSR = 0.001), the
auction revenue is significantly higher than 25.00 ECU (pWSR = 0.001), and
the joint surplus is significantly higher than 58.33 ECU (pWSR = 0.023). This
result seems to be driven by the fact, that risk aversion on the side of the reg-
ular bidder affects the auction revenue under ROFR but not under OM. Note
that this result may be an artefact of the experimental design, which due to
lack of competition among the regular bidders, does not allow us to investigate
the effect of risk aversion on their bidding strategies under OM.
3.7 Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence that favoritism can increase the
joint surplus of a seller and a preferred bidder. Provided that the seller can
collect a sufficient part of the additional surplus, she benefits from granting
the right of first refusal but not from the auction with an optimal reserve
price. This study also sheds light on the feasibility of the implicit assumption
that the seller knows the preferred bidder’s valuation, which is present in some
of the literature on favoritism and corruption in auctions with a share-based
division of surplus among the coalition partners. In particular, Burguet and
Perry (2009) provide a mechanism for the elicitation of the preferred bidder’s
valuation that I show to be incentive compatible for risk-averse bidders as
well. However, in the experiment the reported valuations deviate from the true
ones. The difference between the two decreases with repetition but remains
significant. As noted in the introduction, the willingness of private companies
to reveal their true costs when they interact repeatedly with a procurer is also
questionable. Hence, more research is needed into alternative mechanisms to
form coalitions, which do not require symmetric information of the coalition
partners or whose optimization properties are more robust to deviations from
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equilibrium play.
The experimental results also suggest that even when there are no informa-
tion asymmetries between the seller and the preferred bidder, an auction with
the right of first refusal tends to outperform an auction with an optimal re-
serve price. However, this result may be driven by the particular experimental
setting, where there is only one regular bidder. As a result, the seller and the
preferred bidder can extract risk rents only in the auction with the right of
first refusal but not in the auction with the optimal reserve price, where the
regular bidder’s acceptance of the take-it-or-leave-it offer is not affected by her
risk preferences. Competition among the regular bidders may lead to different
results.
It is important to note that the experimental results rely on a couple of
critical assumptions. Firstly, in line with the general experimental literature,
the preferred bidder’s willingness-to-pay for the respective auction with fa-
voritism is elicited via the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-method (Becker et al.
1964). However, a common problem with this instrument is that it is not
incentive compatible for decisions made under uncertainty (Horowitz 2006;
Karni and Safra 1996). As the preferred bidder’s true benefit from favoritism
is a random variable, the empirical data for the potential benefits for the seller
may therefore be unreliable.
Finally, the analysis assumes that the existence of publicly known favoritism
does not discourage the non-preferred bidders from participating in the auc-
tion. However, if bidders incur entry costs for preparing their bids, for example,
then the common knowledge of favoritism could lead to lower participation.
This in turn decreases the rents that can be extracted from the non-preferred
bidders (Walker 1999), so that they no longer outweigh the losses in auction
revenue. Future research should attempt to provide more insights on the effect
of favoritism in auctions with costly participation.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3, (iii)
Proof In Stage 3 the reserve price r is commonly known. Following Krishna
(2002, Ch. 2.5), in a symmetric equilibrium with N − 1 regular bidder, the
increasing bid function equals
βOM(x) = r
F (r)N−2
F (x)N−2
+
1
F (x)N−2
∫ x
r
z(N − 2)F (z)N−3f(z) dz (3.18)
for x > r and 0 otherwise. In the symmetric, increasing equilibrium, the
expected payoff of a regular bidder Rj, j = {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, with valuation
x is thus ΠOMRj (x, r) = F (x)
N−2(x− βOM(x, r)).
Before Stage 3, r is a function of P’s random valuation, giving an expected
payoff of a regular bidder with valuation x equal to
ΠOMRj (x, r(z)) = F (x)
N−2(x− E[βOM(x, r(z))|x > r(z)])pi(x > r(z))
= F (x)N−2
(
xF (r−1(x))−
∫ r−1(x)
v
βOM(x, r(z))f(z) dz
)
. (3.19)
Thus, in Stage 1, her ex ante expected payoff is given by
EΠOMRj (·) =
∫ v
r(v)
f(x)F (x)N−2
(
xF (r−1(x))
−
∫ r−1(x)
v
βOM(x, r(z))f(z) dz
)
dx. (3.20)

3.8.2 Bidding Functions and Allocative Efficiency with
Risk-Aversion
In the following, the bidding functions under FPA and ROFR are formally
derived. In line with Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and the majority of
the auction literature, a utility function in the form Ui(y) = y
α
i is assumed,
where y ∈ R+, αi ∈ (0, 1], and 1− αi is the measure of Arrow-Pratt constant
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relative risk aversion of player i.21 For tractability, assume that bidders share
the same risk preferences. Valuations are i.i.d. on F (x) ∼ U [v, v]. Cox
et al. show that under FPA the increasing equilibrium bid function is given
by βFPA(x, α) = (x− v)/(1 + α) + v.22
Under ROFR the regular bidder submits a bid bROFR, which maximizes her
expected utility UROFRR (x, b
ROFR, α) = F (bROFR)(x − bROFR)α. With some
abuse of notation, the first-order condition equals
∂U/∂b = f(b)(x− b)α − αF (b)(x− b)α.
This first-order condition is fulfilled when
f(b)(x− b)− αF (b) = 0⇔ x− b = α(b− v)⇔ x+ αv = b(α + 1).
Rearranging this term gives βROFR(x, α) = (x − v)/(1 + α) + v, which is
identical to the equilibrium bid function in the standard first-price auction.
Hence, the bidding behavior of a risk-averse regular bidder is also not affected
by the presence of right of first refusal, when F (x) is a uniform distribution.
Furthermore, for any α ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ F (x) \ {v} the equilibrium bidding
function with risk aversion is greater than the one without.
As noted in Section 3.6, as long as both bidders share the same risk prefer-
ences, the allocative efficiency of the first-price auction is not affected by risk
aversion. In the following, the allocative efficiency of the ROFR is derived,
where α denotes the constant relative risk aversion of the regular bidder. Note
that F (βROFR(x)) = (x−v)/(1+α)+v−v
v−v
= F (x)/(1 + α). Hence, when pi(Ω) de-
notes the probability that an event Ω occurs and P’s valuation equals xP , then
pi(xP > β
ROFR(v)) = α/(1 + α) and pi(xP ≤ β
ROFR(v)) = 1/(1 + α).
Analogous to equation (3.16), when the regular bidder has risk preferences
such that α ∈ (0, 1), the expected allocative efficiency under ROFR is given
21Cox et al. (1982) note that due to −yU ′′i (y)/U
′
i(y) = 1− αi, the interpretation of 1− α
as Arrow-Pratt’s constant relative risk aversion is valid only when the utility function is
defined on income, but not on terminal wealth.
22Note that the solution in Cox et al. (1982) assumes that the bidding function does not
exceed some b¯. Krishna (2002), for example, shows that the equilibrium bidding strategy
with two bidders with identical risk preferences, whose values are drawn from F (x), is the
same as the equilibrium bidding strategy with two risk-neutral bidders, whose values are
drawn from a distribution Fα(x) = F (x)
1/α. Hence, when b¯ = βROFR(v, α) is assumed, no
further analysis for bids above b¯ is required.
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by
θROFR(α) = 1−
[
α
1 + α
∫ v
v
F (z)f(z) dz +
1
1 + α
∫ v
v
(F (z)− F (βROFR(z)))f(z) dz
]
=
(α + 1)2 + 1
2(1 + α)2
=
1
2
+
1
2(1 + α)2
. (3.21)
It is obvious that the allocative efficiency under ROFR is higher for any
α < 1 than for α = 1. Expression (3.21) also demonstrates that for an infinitely
risk-averse regular bidder, ROFR leads to perfect allocative efficiency.
3.8.3 Misreporting under OM
Matthews (1983) demonstrates then when the regular bidder is risk-averse,
r(x) no longer optimizes the expected joint surplus of the seller and the pre-
ferred bidder (regardless of the preferred bidder’s risk preferences).23 However,
if the elicitation mechanism is such that it fulfills all requirements of Lemma 2
in Maskin and Riley (1984), its incentive compatibility remains unaffected by
the preferred bidder’s risk preferences.
Proposition 3.6 The elicitation mechanism under OM with allocation rule
F (r(x))N−1 and transfer T (x) =
∫ x
v
F (r(z))N−1 dz, where r(x) is the reserve
price defined in Section 3.2, fulfills the conditions in Lemma 2 in Maskin and
Riley (1984).
Proof Firstly, the utility function is such that U(y) is continuously differen-
tiable, U ′(y) > 0, U ′′(y) < 0, and ∂2U(y1, y2)/∂y1∂y2 ≤ 0 for every α ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, the probability to win F (r(x))N−1 and the transfer T (x) are non-
decreasing in x. Denote with V (x, x) = max
x̂
V (x̂, x) the maximized expected
utility, where
V (x̂, x) = F (r(x̂))N−1U(x+ T (x̂)− x̂) + (1− F (r(x̂))N−1)U(T (x̂)).
Since V (x, x) is an increasing function, Lemma 2 in Maskin and Riley (1984)
postulates that a mechanism is incentive compatible when it fulfills the follow-
23In fact, the joint surplus could be increased, if instead of a reserve price with sure
outcome, the regular bidder is offered a lottery which extracts additional rents for risk
avoidance.
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ing condition:
d
dx
V (x, x) =
∂
∂x̂
V (x, x̂). (3.22)
As V (x, x̂) = F (r(x))N−1U(x̂+T (x)−x)+(1−F (r(x))N−1)U(T (x)), the term
on the right-hand side equals
∂V (x, x̂)
∂x̂
|x̂=x = F (r(x))
N−1α(x̂+ T (x)− x)α−1
= F (r(x))N−1αT (x)α−1, (3.23)
while the term on the left-hand side equals
d
dx
V (x, x) =
dT (x)α
dx
= αT (x)α−1F (r(x))N−1. (3.24)
From (3.23) and (3.24) it is obvious that the condition in (3.22) is fulfilled. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Due to the properties of T (x)
and F (r(x)), a risk-neutral preferred bidder does not have incentives to re-
port valuations lower than her true one. However, for any x̂ > x she incurs
costs that in expectation are higher than the benefit of the additional transfer.
Hence, x̂ = x maximizes the trade-off between the secure payment T (x) and
the expected costs (or benefits) from x− x̂. A risk-averse preferred bidder has
a higher utility from a secure payment T (x) than a lottery with the same ex-
pected payment. Hence, she would have even stronger incentives to avoid the
risk of not winning when x > x̂ or winning, but incurring costs when x < x̂.
Thus, risk aversion reinforces the pull towards x̂ = x.
Despite the theoretical incentive compatibility of the elicitation mechanism,
there is significant misreporting with absolute deviation between the reported
and true valuation equal to 17.562 ECU (SD=3.521) in the first 30 rounds
and 14.275 ECU (SD=3.303) in the second 30 rounds. Thus, although with
repetition deviations from equilibrium decrease, they do not disappear. Tables
3.4 and 3.5 support the analysis in Section 3.6.
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Table 3.4: Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of
Misreporting on the Preferred Bidder’s Payoff
Variable/Model (I) (II) (III)
|reported - true valuation| -0.162** -0.153** -0.159**
Valuation 0.742*** 0.705*** 0.707***
Winner 9.222*** 9.196***
Round -0.026
Constant -8.482*** -13.377*** -12.541***
N 1482 1482 1482
Nr. of clustersa 10 10 10
R2 between 0.566 0.565 0.569
R2 within 0.729 0.754 0.754
R2 overall 0.726 0.75 0.751
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; a clustered on the observa-
tion level, with robust error terms.
Table 3.5: Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of Repetition
on Misreporting
Variable/Model (I)a (II)a (III)a (IV)a
Round -0.124* -0.419** -0.135** -0.446**
Round squared 0.005** 0.005**
Valuation 0.128** 0.128**
Constant 19.760*** 22.828*** 13.721*** 16.920***
N 1482 1482 1482 1482
Nr. of clustersb 10 10 10 10
R2 between 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.001
R2 within 0.024 0.033 0.096 0.106
R2 overall 0.018 0.0251 0.0745 0.0825
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; ; a dependent variable is
|reported valuation - true valuation|; b clustered on the observation level,
with robust error terms.
3.8.4 Instructions
In the following the instructions for the experiment are provided. A [Treatment]
indicates which sections were present only in the instructions of the respective
treatment.
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Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment! Please read
these instructions thoroughly. We kindly ask you to refrain from talking to
or in any other way communicating with other participants. We also ask
you to turn off your mobile phones. Please raise your hand if you have any
questions. The experimenter will then come to you and answer your questions.
All participants have received the same instructions.
General Information
You will be able to earn money during this experiment. Your respective amount
depends on your own decisions but also on decisions of other participants.
During the experiment your current payoff is calculated in ECU (Experimental
Currency Units). 30 ECU equals 1 Euro. At the end of the experiment your
profits will be converted into Euro according to this exchange rate and paid
out to you in cash plus a 2.50 Euro show-up fee.
This experiment is made up of two identical parts of 30 rounds respectively.
You will receive a starting credit of 100 ECU at the beginning of each part.
This amount can vary as a result of your behavior over the 30 rounds. Whether
part 1 or part 2 is relevant for your final payoff, will be determined by chance
at the end of the experiment.
In each round two persons interact with each other. We will denote one
person as “participant A” and the other as “participant B”. You will be as-
signed your role, participant A or participant B, by chance at the beginning
of the experiment. You will keep the role you have been assigned over the
entire experiment. In each round, you will be randomly matched to another
participant. The matching of participants will remain strictly anonymous.
How can I earn money?
In each of the 30 rounds of one part of the experiment, you will be able to
acquire a fictitious good. If in one round you acquire the fictitious good, the
experimenter will credit you with ECU at the end of this round. The respective
amount of ECU depends on your “valuation” of the fictitious good. For your
final payoff for the respective round other costs or credits that may arise will
be deducted or respectively added to this valuation (see below). The valuation
will vary between participants and rounds. The valuation for both participants
will be determined by chance and will be a number with one decimal place,
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between 0.0 ECU and 100.0 ECU. Each number will be equally likely. The
valuation of the other participant will be determined according to the same
rules as yours, it will be independent from your valuation, and usually it will
differ from yours. (At no time point of the experiment will you be informed
about the valuation of the other participant.)
The course of a round?
The chart on the next page illustrates the possible course of one round. The
following text outlines the individual steps in detail.
[Figure 3.1 and 3.2 were respectively displayed.]
Explanations to the chart
The price decisions of the two matched participants determine who pur-
chases the fictitious good. Participant A can influence whether the price deci-
sion is taken simultaneously or sequentially (see chart on the previous page).
Both participants learn their respective valuation as soon as the course of the
round has been determined.
If price decisions are taken simultaneously, both participants submit their
price for the fictitious good at the same time without receiving any further
information. The participant, who submit the higher price, receives the ficti-
tious good and pays the price he submitted. The other participant does not
receive the good and pays nothing. In case of a tie, who receives the fictitious
good is determined by chance.
[ROFR] If price decisions are taken sequentially, participant B submits his
price first. Participant A can then acquire the good at the price submitted by
participant B. If he turns this price down, then participant B receives the good
and pays the price he submitted.
[OM] If price decisions are taken sequentially, participant A specifies a price
between 50.0 and 100.0 ECU. Participant B can acquire the fictitious good at
this price. If he turns this price down, then participant A receives the fictitious
good and pays a price, which depends on the price he submitted, but differs from
it. Additionally, participant A is credited a fixed transfer that also depends
on the price specified for participant B, regardless of who receives the good.
The table at the end of these instructions presents the prices and the transfers
for participant A for some alternative price specifications for participant B.
Participant A can use an automatic calculator to learn the exact amounts for
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other price specifications before he commits to a certain price.
How does participant A decide on the course of a round?
At the beginning of each round, before the participants have received any
information about their valuation, participant A states the maximum amount
he is willing to pay in order for price decisions to be taken sequentially (and
not simultaneously). The actual price he has to pay is determined by chance.
The price is a number with one decimal place between -10.0 ECU and 25.0
ECU. (Note: A negative price corresponds to a credit.) Each number is equally
likely. If the amount stated by participant A is at least as high as the price
determined by chance, then price decisions are taken sequentially during this
round, and at the end of the round participant A pays the price determined by
chance. Otherwise, price decisions are taken simultaneously, and participant
A has no extra costs at the end of this round. Please note, that participant
A does not pay the price he stated, but the price determined by chance. It is,
therefore, optimal for him to consider what sequential price decision making
(instead of simultaneous price decision making) is worth to him and state this
amount as his maximum willingness-to-pay.
How high is the payoff of participant A at the end of each round?
If price decisions are taken simultaneously and participant A receives the
fictitious good, he is credited his valuation minus the price he submitted. If
price decisions are taken simultaneously and participant A does not receive the
fictitious good, then his payoff is zero.
[ROFR] If price decisions are taken sequentially, then participant A always
has to pay the price for sequential price decisions determined by chance. If he
receives the fictitious good, then he is credited his valuation minus the price
submitted by participant B. If he does not receive the fictitious good, he does
not get any credits.
[OM] If price decisions are taken sequentially, then participant A always has
to pay the price for sequential price decisions determined by chance. Addi-
tionally, he is credited the fixed transfer from the experimenter, which depends
on the price specified for participant B. If he receives the fictitious good, then
he is also credited his valuation minus the price that results from his price
specifications for participant B. If he does not receive the fictive good, he does
not get any additional credits.
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How high is the payoff of participant B at the end of each round?
[ROFR] If participant B receives the fictitious good, then he is credited his
valuation minus the price he submitted. If he does not receive the fictitious
good, his payoff equals zero. His payoff at the end of a round, thus, does not
depend on whether price decisions were taken simultaneously or sequentially.
[OM] If participant B receives the fictitious good and price decisions were
taken simultaneously, then he is credited his valuation minus the price he
stated. If participant B receives the fictitious good and price decisions were
taken sequentially, then he is credited his valuation minus the price specified by
participant A. If he does not receive the fictitious good, his payoff equals zero,
regardless of whether price decisions were taken simultaneously or sequentially.
What happens if the payoff is negative in one round?
Losses incurred in some rounds will be set off against gains in other rounds.
If the dice determines that a part of the experiment in which you have accu-
mulated losses is the part relevant for your final payoff, then these losses will
be set off against the 2.50 Euro show-up fee.
What information do I receive?
You will be informed about your own valuation once it has been determined,
and whether price decisions are taken simultaneously or sequentially and before
you have to make a price decision. Additionally, participant A is immediately
informed about the price for sequential price decisions determined by chance.
After simultaneous price decisions, you will receive the following information
at the end of each round: whether you have received the fictitious good, what
was the highest price, and how high is your payoff for this round.
After sequential price decisions, you will receive the following information at
the end of each round: the price determined by the other participant, whether
you have received the fictitious good, and how high is your payoff for this
round.
Final remarks
In total, you will play for 60 rounds. At the end of the experiment, one
participant will toss a dice and thereby determine which part of the experiment
is relevant for your final payoff (uneven number = first part, even number =
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second part). All rounds are relevant for your final payoff until the die has
been tossed at the end of the experiment. Please raise your hand if you have
any questions.
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Table 3.6: Price and Transfer for Participant A (PT A)
Depending on the Price Specified for Participant B (PT B)
Price for Price for Transfer Price for Price for Transfer Price for Price for Transfer
PT B PT A for PT A PT B PT A for PT A PT B PT A for PT A
50.0 0.0 0.0 67.0 34.0 19.9 84.0 68.0 45.6
50.5 1.0 0.5 67.5 35.0 20.6 84.5 69.0 46.4
51.0 2.0 1.0 68.0 36.0 21.2 85.0 70.0 47.3
51.5 3.0 1.5 68.5 37.0 21.9 85.5 71.0 48.1
52.0 4.0 2.0 69.0 38.0 22.6 86.0 72.0 49.0
52.5 5.0 2.6 69.5 39.0 23.3 86.5 73.0 49.8
53.0 6.0 3.1 70.0 40.0 24.0 87.0 74.0 50.7
53.5 7.0 3.6 70.5 41.0 24.7 87.5 75.0 51.6
54.0 8.0 4.2 71.0 42.0 25.4 88.0 76.0 52.4
54.5 9.0 4.7 71.5 43.0 26.1 88.5 77.0 53.3
55.0 10.0 5.3 72.0 44.0 26.8 89.0 78.0 54.2
55.5 11.0 5.8 72.5 45.0 27.6 89.5 79.0 55.1
56.0 12.0 6.4 73.0 46.0 28.3 90.0 80.0 56.0
56.5 13.0 6.9 73.5 47.0 29.0 90.5 81.0 56.9
57.0 14.0 7.5 74.0 48.0 29.8 91.0 82.0 57.8
57.5 15.0 8.1 74.5 49.0 30.5 91.5 83.0 58.7
58.0 16.0 8.6 75.0 50.0 31.3 92.0 84.0 59.6
58.5 17.0 9.2 75.5 51.0 32.0 92.5 85.0 60.6
59.0 18.0 9.8 76.0 52.0 32.8 93.0 86.0 61.5
59.5 19.0 10.4 76.5 53.0 33.5 93.5 87.0 62.4
60.0 20.0 11.0 77.0 54.0 34.3 94.0 88.0 63.4
60.5 21.0 11.6 77.5 55.0 35.1 94.5 89.0 64.3
61.0 22.0 12.2 78.0 56.0 35.8 95.0 90.0 65.3
61.5 23.0 12.8 78.5 57.0 36.6 95.5 91.0 66.2
62.0 24.0 13.4 79.0 58.0 37.4 96.0 92.0 67.2
62.5 25.0 14.1 79.5 59.0 38.2 96.5 93.0 68.1
63.0 26.0 14.7 80.0 60.0 39.0 97.0 94.0 69.1
63.5 27.0 15.3 80.5 61.0 39.8 97.5 95.0 70.1
64.0 28.0 16.0 81.0 62.0 40.6 98.0 96.0 71.0
64.5 29.0 16.6 81.5 63.0 41.4 98.5 97.0 72.0
65.0 30.0 17.3 82.0 64.0 42.2 99.0 98.0 73.0
65.5 31.0 17.9 82.5 65.0 43.1 99.5 99.0 74.0
66.0 32.0 18.6 83.0 66.0 43.9 100.0 100.0 75.0
66.5 33.0 19.2 83.5 67.0 44.7
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Chapter 4
The Effect of Different
Allocation Mechanisms in
Emissions Trading Markets
The content of the following chapter was produced in collaboration with Veronika
Grimm.
4.1 Introduction
As part of their strategy to curb greenhouse gas emissions governments
are increasingly adopting various forms of emissions trading. The European
Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS), the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the U.S., and the Carbon Pollution Re-
duction Schemes (CPRS) in Australia are just a few examples of its large-scale
implementation. The reason behind emissions trading’s increasing popularity
is the prevalent belief among economists that it is a highly efficient mechanism
to control greenhouse gases.1
The efficiency of a particular emissions trading market, however, depends
on the details of its market design. One of the most controversial issues is the
initial allocation mechanism for allowances. While in theory tradable emission
permits allow the regulated industry to efficiently reduce its emissions regard-
less of the initial allocation (Montgomery 1972), in practice different allocation
1While the regulator may have other goals, such as revenue maximization or transparency
of the environmental instrument, we believe efficiency to be the most important one.
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rules may lead to different outcomes. Two allocation mechanisms are usually
discussed — free allocation (called grandfathering) and auctioning. Free allo-
cation is preferred by the industry, which makes it more politically feasible.
Auctioning is favored by the majority of economists due to its transparency
and alleged efficiency (see Betz, Seifert, Cramton and Kerr 2010; Cramton and
Kerr 2002; Hepburn, Grubb, Neuhoff, Matthes and Tse 2006; Holt et al. 2007;
Ockenfels 2009), and is increasingly being used in the context of emissions
trading2, firing the discussion about a proper auction mechanism.
Although in recent years different auction formats have been used prior to
emission trading in RGGI and EU ETS it is hardly feasible to directly com-
pare the success of auctions and grandfathering using field data.3 Auctions
typically cover only a part of the allocated permits and coexist with grandfa-
thering. Still, most previous and current recommendations for auction design
are based on theoretical argumentation without any systematic empirical ev-
idence from the field or controlled experiments.4 We contribute to filling this
gap by running an experiment which investigates market performance under
two commonly recommended auction designs (Neuhoff, Matthes, Betz, Dro¨ge,
Johnston, Kudelko, Lo¨schel, Monjon, Mohr, Sato and Suwala 2008) and com-
pare them to a special kind of free allocation procedure. In particular, we in-
vestigate the effects of more and less frequent auctioning on the efficiency of a
secondary market for emission permits. To control for any effects caused by the
auction as a method of allocation we also run a treatment with grandfathered
permits, which is identical to the treatment with less frequent auctioning in
all respects except for the free allocation of permits.
We find that the frequency of auctioning affects the ability of the market
to deliver cost-efficient joint compliance within the system. We attribute this
observation to an interaction effect between the auction and the secondary
2At least 70% (and increasing) of the emission permits in the RGGI have already been
auctioned. A large share of the permits in the CPRS and EU ETS (up to 70% in 2020) will
be auctioned.
3Most of the auctions were single-round, sealed-bid, unform-price formats, however, they
differed in terms of their frequency and the supply-demand ratio. Auctions in RGGI take
place on quarterly basis and have been lately characterized by supply surplus, (RRGI 2012),
while auctions in EU ETS are without ex ante fixed and commonly know dates and with
significant shortage of supply (Co2-Handel.de 2012a; CO2-Handel.de 2012b).
4An exception is the design of the RGGI auctions, where Holt et al. (2007) had run a
series of experiments within the design process.
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market and to stronger overbidding in the smaller but more frequent auctions.
In addition to inducing more efficient prices, less frequent auctioning leads
to more efficient allocation after trade on the secondary markets. As a result,
total compliance cost tends to be lower if permits are auctioned less frequently.
When studying the method of allocation – for free or against a payment – we
find that it does not affect the efficiency of final allocation of permits (after
trade on secondary market). However, it influences the temporal development
of market prices as well as banking and borrowing behavior. On the one
hand, auctioning leads to earlier abatement activities, on the other hand, it
increases total compliance cost. Under all allocation rules we studied, the static
efficiency of the emissions trading system is hampered by naive abatement and
trade decisions. As a result, neither market managed to deliver nearly perfect
allocation despite the use of double auction as trading institution.
Let us briefly review the related literature. The experimental and theo-
retical literature provides abundant evidence for the effect of different design
aspects on the efficiency of an emission permit market.5 However, we are aware
of only few experiments that study the effect of different initial allocation rules
on the functioning of a subsequent trading market. Previous work that also
analyzes a secondary market includes experimental comparisons of auctioning
and grandfathering by Benz and Ehrhart (2007) and Goeree, Holt, Palmer,
Shobe and Burtraw (2010), as well as a comparison of different types of auc-
tions by Holt et al. (2007). Our work differs from those studies with respect
to the design of the grandfathering treatment, the use of increasing (instead
of constant) marginal abatement costs functions, and the trading institution
employed. In an attempt to closely mirror a real trade exchange, we use con-
tinuous double auction, which is known for its high efficiency in the lab6 as
opposed to the dynamic uniform double auction and the single-round, limit-
order, call market used in Benz and Ehrhart (2007) and Goeree et al. (2010),
respectively.
Holt et al. (2007) compare several auction types and find that sealed-bid and
5For review of experiments on banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement, see
Cason (2010). For the role of transaction costs, see Stavins (1995) and Cason and Gangad-
haran (2003). For the role of the trading institution, see Cason and Gangadharan (1998)
and Muller, Mestelman, Spraggon and Godby (2002).
6For examples of highly efficient continuous double auction in the context of emission
trading see Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) and Sturm (2008).
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ascending-clock auctions perform equally well. They recommend frequent auc-
tioning for reasons of planing security and liquidity constraints of generators, as
well as competition considerations. However, they do not provide experimen-
tal results that support this conjecture. Benz and Ehrhart (2007) and Goeree
et al. (2010) compare auctioning and grandfathering and find that, at least for
relatively stringent emission caps, markets with auctioned permits tend to out-
perform markets with grandfathered permits. However, in both experiments
the initial allocation before trade is endogenous in the auction treatments and
(arbitrarily) exogenous in the grandfathering treatments. Hence, the observed
differences in the final permit allocation can be due to both, the initial alloca-
tion7 as well as the allocation method. The specifics of our allocation design
allow us to disentangle these two factors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 4.2 we give
detailed description of our experimental design and procedure. In Section
4.3 we present a simple theoretical model and derive some hypotheses. The
experimental results are reported and discussed in Section 4.4, Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Experimental Design and Procedure
General Settings
We conducted a computerized trading experiment8 which was designed to
closely mirror the market settings of the EU ETS. Banking and quasi-borrowing
were allowed (see below for details). For reasons of simplicity any interaction
with a downstream market was disregarded.9
Similarly to the second phase of EU ETS, one emission permit market con-
sisted of four compliance periods. Each compliance period had the following
stages: allocation stage(s), in which permits were distributed among the mar-
ket participants according to the treatment rule; four trade and production
stages, in which participants could abate emissions and trade permits; a check
of compliance, where compliance with the emission target for the preceding
7See Stavins (1995) for a theoretical and Cason and Gangadharan (2003) for an empirical
example of when the initial, pre-trade allocation affects post-trade allocation.
8The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
9For studies of the effect of different allocation rules on the downstream market see
Goeree et al. (2010) and Wr˚ake, Myers, Mandell, Holt and Burtraw (2008).
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trade and production stages was controlled and non-compliance was punished.
The exact sequence of stages in the benchmark treatment is depicted in Figure
4.1.
Figure 4.1: Sequence of Stages in the Benchmark Treatment
A compliance period always started with an allocation stage. In the bench-
mark treatment with single auctioning, A1, and in the treatment with free
allocation (or, grandfathering), G, the allocation stage was followed by a se-
quence of four consecutive trade and production stages. In the treatment with
frequent auctioning, A4, an allocation stage preceded each of the four trade
and production stages. For each trade and production stage participants re-
ceived an emission target, which was privately disclosed at the beginning of a
respective stage. Participants could meet these targets through trade of per-
mits and through abatement. Individual abatement decisions remained private
knowledge. Trading transactions were common knowledge (see below for de-
tails). Compliance for any of the stages was not required before the compliance
check stage. Participants paid a fine only for missing permits at the time of
the compliance check.10 Banking within and across compliance periods was
allowed. The amount of banked and missing permits remained private knowl-
edge. Similarly to EU ETS, we simulated quasi-borrowing by allowing for
an overlap between the compliance periods, such that (part of the) permits
10The height of the fine was equal to 2.6 times the the value of the ex ante efficient permit
price. Similarly to EU ETS, this fine did not release noncompliant participants from the
obligation to provide missing permits in the following compliance period.
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from one compliance period could be used to meet the emission target in the
preceding one.
A special characteristic of our experimental design is the information struc-
ture. The emission target of every participant was a random discrete number
independently drawn from a commonly known uniform distribution. This num-
ber varied across participants and production stages. At the beginning of each
trade and production stage participants were privately informed about their
own respective emission target. One’s future emission targets as well as the
emission target’s of one’s opponents were only known in expectation.11
Allocation Stage
In A1 the emission permits for one compliance period were sold in a single
auction. In A4 emission permits were sold in four identical auctions. In G,
similarly to the benchmark treatment, emission permits were given to par-
ticipants in one single round of free allocation per compliance period. The
overall amount of emission permits allocated for each compliance period re-
mained constant throughout the experiment and was publicly known. The
quasi-borrowing design of EU ETS was mimicked by setting the compliance
check only after allocation of all permits (in A1 and G) or one quarter of the
permits (in A4) for the subsequent compliance period had taken place.
In the auction treatments we used single-round, multi-unit, sealed-bid,
uniform-price auctions.12 Participants were required to submit demand sched-
ules for a given set of prices. Individual demand schedules were aggregated to
form a demand function, via which the auction clearing price was calculated.
Bids were served according to the individual demand functions resulting from
the demand schedules. After the auction all participants were informed about
the auction clearing price and the number of permits they had won. One’s bid
schedule and wins remained private knowledge.
In the free allocation treatment permits were distributed among traders in
a way to closely mirror the average pre-trade efficiency of allocation in A1 as
11We introduced this additional complexity in order to capture the uncertainty most
regulated firms face about their permit demand at the time of allocation. For instance, in
the energy sector variations in the availability of renewable energy also leads to uncertain
level of emissions at the time of permit allocation.
12The majority of auctions in the EU ETS and all of the RGGI auctions had this general
format.
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observed in the last compliance period.13 Participants learned the number of
permits, which they were going to receive for free each compliance period at
the beginning of the experiment. This amount did not change throughout the
experiment.
Trade and Production Stage
After being privately informed about her emission target in the respective
stage, each participant could meet this target by using permits received in the
allocation stage, using permits bought in the secondary market, and conduct-
ing individual abatement. Individual abatement incurred costs, which were on
the margin equal to the abated amount.14 In addition to a printed table in
the instructions with the marginal and total costs for any possible abatement
level, participants were informed about the respective costs by an automatic
calculator before they could commit to an abatement decision.
The trading environment in the trade and production stage was a comput-
erized, continuous double auction without any bid-ask spread-reduction rules.
Within a randomly drawn duration of a trading period15, participants could
submit bids to buy and offers to sell or accept (part of) other traders’ bids and
offers. Bids and offers were price-quantity bundles on the demand and supply
side of the market. The list of open bids and offers and the price of the most
recent transaction were public information.
Framing and Procedure
The emission trading market was framed as a market for a single input fac-
tor. In particular, participants were told that they are firms who have to
serve an exogenously given amount of delivery commitment for a final product,
which represented the emission target (in the following also called “external
demand”). They could do so by using up already available units of the input
13Note that in G permits are not grandfathered in the sense that allocation is based on
past or expected emissions. However, this method of allocation allows us to disentangle the
effects of the efficiency of pre-trade allocation and the allocation method. Additional details
are available on request.
14For simplicity, it was possible to abate all emissions of one trade and production stage.
15The duration was randomly drawn from an interval of [3.5,4.0] minutes. Uncertainty
about the exact duration of the trade and production stage creates incentives for early
trading. The uniform distribution of the possible duration was common knowledge.
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factor, e.g., emission permits, or by producing (part of) the necessary input
factor, e.g., abatement of emissions.16
Participants were students of Business and Economics or another Economics
related field at the University of Cologne. They were recruited via ORSEE
(Greiner 2004). Upon entering the lab 32 participants were randomly assigned
to one of two trading groups with 16 traders each.17 The composition of the
groups did not change throughout the experiment.
Before the beginning of the experiment participants received written in-
structions, which they read in private. Also in private, they answered ques-
tions testing their understanding of the instructions and had the possibility to
try out a simulation of the trading environment with the computer as trad-
ing partner. The whole experiment took 2.5-3 hours to complete, from which
1-1.25 were reserved for the learning stage. We gathered 5 independent ob-
servations per treatment, with a total of 240 participants – 80 per treatment.
Participants earned on average 22.86e (SD=7.13) with substantial differences
across the treatments.
4.3 Theoretical Predictions
In the appendix we develop a theoretical model that motivates the follow-
ing hypotheses. For simplicity (and partly diverging from our experimental
setting) we assume a competitive permit market and no transaction costs for
participating in the auction or the secondary market.
Hypothesis 4.1 (Compliance) All firms are compliant.
Hypothesis 4.2 (Abatement) In each trading and production stage all par-
ticipants choose the same abatement level. The abatement level depends pos-
itively on the level of aggregate realized demand, which is reflected in the
permit price. Abatement in earlier periods equals expected abatement in later
16It has been argued that a non-neutral framing would promote higher abatement levels
due to potential environmental concerns of the participants. However, lab and field exper-
iments by Ostertag, Schleich, Ehrhart, Goebes, Mu¨ller, Seifert and Ku¨pfer (2010) for the
trade of land urbanization rights indicate that if there are any differences between practi-
tioners and students and neutral and non-neutral framing, then they are only quantitative
and insignificant. Besides, as reported below, we observe too high abatement levels despite
the neutral framing.
17One out of three sessions per treatment was conducted with one trading group, thus
making random assignment to one of two groups impossible.
74
periods, given the information all participants already have on the level of
external demand (via the permit price).
Hypothesis 4.3 (Permit Price) The permit price does not depend on the
allocation procedure. The permit price depends positively on the level of
realized aggregate demand. The permit price in earlier periods equals the
expected permit price in later periods.
Hypothesis 4.4 (Permit Demand) Individual total permit demand (over
all periods) is proportional to total individual realized external demand (over
all periods).
Hypothesis 4.5 (Auction) The willingness-to-pay in the auction equals the
ex ante expected permit price, the auction price is weakly lower than this price.
The auction frequency does not affect the pre-trade allocation of permits.
Hypothesis 4.6 (Banking and Borrowing) In the case of two successive
compliance periods banking (borrowing) occurs if observed external demand
was lower (higher) than expected in the first compliance period.
Hypothesis 4.7 (Allocation) The allocation procedure does not affect the
final efficiency of allocation.
4.4 Experimental Results
In this section we first analyze the static efficiency with respect to the total
compliance costs caused by individual abatement and purchase of permits at
the observed prices. Then, we take a closer look at the efficiency of allocation
of permits and efficiency gains induced by the secondary market. Finally, we
discuss dynamic inefficiencies induced by positive levels of banking, borrowing,
and non-compliance. We compare our benchmark treatment with any of the
other two treatments using aggregate data on the group-level as one observa-
tion, unless otherwise stated. Table 4.1 presents an overview of the observed
average values for each treatment and the way they relate to the theoretically
efficient values and the benchmark treatment.18 The theoretically efficient
values were calculated according to our model presented in the appendix.
18The reported prices are a weighted average of the transaction prices over all trading
and production stages. The reported average standard deviation is over all transactions in a
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Table 4.1: Overview of the Main Variables
Treatment A4 A1 G Th. Prediction
Payoffs (in EUR) 19.90 <∗∗ 23.54 <∗ 25.15 -
(6.21) (6.25) (7.84)
Abatement level 17.48† ≈ 17.95† >∗ 16.40 16.69
(13.41) (12.10) (12.23)
Price level 21.98† >∗∗ 17.61 <∗ 18.36 16.69
(8.07) (5.03) (2.92)
Pre-trade all. efficiency 0.42† ≈ 0.44 - 0.43 -a
(0.06) (0.08) (0.00)
Post-trade all. efficiency 0.64† <∗ 0.73† ≈ 0.71† 100
(0.09) (0.03) (0.05)
Legend: † p < 0.1 for two-sided WSR-test for 6= efficient level; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and
∗∗∗p < 0.001 for one-sided MWU-test for between-treatment differences. a no theoretical
prediction due to the existence of multiple equilibria. Note: Standard deviation across inde-
pendent groups in parenthesis.
Due to the low number of independent observations, we use the following ex-
act non-parametric tests: One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test (WSR) for
comparison between predicted and observed values and for paired data within
one treatment; and Mann-Whitney U-test (MWU) for between-treatment com-
parisons.
Abatement Levels
In the auction treatments the observed average abatement level is significantly
different from the cost-efficient level. A cross-treatment comparison shows that
the average abatement level tends to differ between A1 and G, but not between
the auction treatments. In the following we investigate the determinants of the
individual abatement level as predicted by our theoretical model (Hypothesis
4.2). In particular, no effect of the individually observed external demand and
a positive effect of the observed permit price are expected.
Figure 4.2 depicts the average and individual abatement levels in selected
representative trading groups from all treatments. At first glance average
abatement correlates strongly with average price.19 However, the average lev-
treatment without accounting for any weighting. Multivariate Hadi’s outliers were excluded
from the calculation.
19Correlation coefficients per session vary between 0.61 and 0.89 and they are significant
at p < 0.01 and lower. Average abatement and price levels per compliance period are
significantly different only in the first two periods in A4 and in the last two in A1 (pWSR =
0.063), when permit prices are inefficiently high or low, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Average and Individual Abatement Levels and
Permit Prices in Selected Trading Groups
els result from a combination of irrationally low and irrationally high individ-
ual levels, which differ greatly from the average price.20 Table 4.2 presents
the results of a clustered Ordinary Least Squares Model (OLS), which was
estimated for each treatment separately and shows that individual decisions
do not depend on the average observed market price. The regression equation
is as follows:
abatementgit = b0 + b1avgpricegt + b2demandgit + b3suffpermitsgit
+b4Wgi + b5Zg + b6Tgt + εgit
The indices g, i, and t denote the respective trading group, participant,
and trade and production stage. abatementgit is the observed abatement level,
avgpricegt is the observed average price at the secondary market, demand git
is the external demand participant i observed in trade and production stage
t (linear and squared), suffpermitsgit is a dummy equal to 1 if in t − 1 the
20Exogenous restriction on abatement could occur if the realized external demand, which
was uniformly distributed on [5, 55] and serves as an upper constraint for the periodical
abatement level, was lower than the observed permit price.
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participant possessed enough permits to cover her total unabated emissions
until t, Wgi and Zg are vectors of participant and group specific characteristics
respectively, Tit is a vector with dummy variables for the different trading
stages, and εgit is the error component.
21 Through robust regression coefficients
we mitigate any effects of heteroskedasticity.22 The estimates are clustered on
the participant level.23
Column (OLS) shows the estimates for the complete regression model spec-
ified above with data from the whole experiment. The columns (OLS (1))
and (OLS (4)) display the results of the regression model with data from the
first and the last compliance period, respectively. Column (IV) shows the es-
timates for an instrumental variable model which corrects for the exogeneity
assumption about the average permit price.24 The last two columns present
the results of the separate IV-regression for the first and the last compliance
period, respectively. As instrument for the price we use the auction clearing
price in the preceding auction which would have occurred had participant i not
taken part in it. First-stage F-values suggest that, except for the last compli-
ance period in A1, the instrument used has good predictive power. To compare
the coefficients between the models within and across treatments, we run OLS
models with pooled data and complete interaction effects for the comparison
treatment.
Contrary to Hypothesis 4.2, the level of individual external demand has a
positive and highly significant effect on the level of abatement in all treat-
ments, whereas the effect of the average observed permit price is present only
in A1, where it decreases with learning. Also with learning the effect of indi-
vidual external demand decreases significantly in A1 but increases in A4 and
G. As a result, cross-treatment differences remain significant but change their
direction over time. These estimates contradict the observations in Figure 4.2
but support the idea that although on average abatement and price levels are
21We control whether the session of the trading group was conducted before or after noon
and for the level of self-reported experience in laboratory experiments, trading markets, and
auctions.
22White-test for heteroskedasticity is rejected for all treatments at p = 0.001.
23It has been suggested to cluster the estimates on the trading group level. However, due
to the low number of independent observations, the estimates then become unreliable. The
group dummies above should control for some of the within-group interdependencies.
24The estimates correct for the assumption that 16 participants per market are sufficient
to ensure that individual abatement does not influence total permit demand.
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Table 4.2: Determinants of the Abatement Level
a. Treatment A1a
Variable OLS OLS (1) OLS (4) (IV) IV (1) IV (4)
Avg. price 0.530*** 0.285 0.768* 0.551* 0.401 14.746
Ext. dem. 0.876*** 1.078*** 0.359* 0.876*** 1.077*** 0.298
Ext. dem. sq. -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.002 -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.001
Suff. permits -2.427** -4.464** -2.298 -2.424** -4.435** -3.437
Constant -4.952 1.024 -0.369 -8.977** -1.531 -161.351
N 1280 320 320 1280 320 320
First stage F(1,79) 392.68 770.91 0.04
R2 0.377 0.363 0.27 0.377 0.363 -5.69
b. Treatment A4a
Variable OLS OLS (1) OLS (4) (IV) IV (1) IV (4)
Avg. price 0.188 0.313 0.220 0.290 0.332 -0.066
Ext. dem. 0.689*** 0.558* 0.901*** 0.691*** 0.558** 0.898***
Ext. dem. sq. -0.005** -0.001 -0.012*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.012***
Suff. permits -3.660*** -5.428** -2.815 -3.584*** -5.411** -2.930*
Constant 3.328 -0.899 3.174 1.031 3.273 4.976
N 1280 320 320 1280 320 320
First stage F(1,79) 1801.39 1116.67 425.32
R2 0.369 0.385 0.223 0.368 0.385 0.218
b. Treatment Ga
Variable OLS OLS (1) OLS (4)
Avg. price 0.352 0.807 0.454
Ext. dem. 0.811*** 0.276 1.006***
Ext. dem. sq. -0.008*** 0.001 -0.012***
Suff. permits -1.156 -4.952** -0.325
Constant -10.365 -3.389 -7.337
N 1280 320 320
R2 0.271 0.324 0.234
Legend: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; a Nr. of clusters = 80. Note: Estimates
clustered on the subject level.
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correlated, most participants fail to perceive the role of the market price as
signal for the scarcity of permits in the market. Hence, participants tend to
wrongly base their abatement decision on the individual demand observation
instead of on the observed market price.
Notably, a strong and unpredicted effect is observed for the possession of
sufficient permits to cover total unabated emissions. This effect is, however, in
line with a suggestion in Gagelmann (2008) that in order to be less dependent
on the market risk-averse buyers (sellers) of permits are expected to have higher
(lower) levels of abatement than the efficient one.
Result 4.1 (Abatement) Firms choose different abatement levels. Gener-
ally abatement in earlier periods does not equal expected abatement in later
periods, given the information all firms already have on the level of exter-
nal demand. Abatement levels depend significantly on the level of individual
external demand and on the amount of permits at hand after the allocation
stage. If permits are auctioned only once at the beginning of a compliance
period (treatment A1), abatement also depends on the current permit price
level.
Permit Prices
Table 4.3 present the average permit prices per compliance period and Figure
4.3 displays the average permit prices per trade and production stage. In the
figure the beginning of a new compliance period is indicated by its respective
number and the number of its first trade and production stage. The figure
contains auction clearing prices (in the auction treatments), as well as permit
prices in the secondary market.25
The observed average prices over all compliance periods are not significantly
different from the efficient one with the exception of A4. Hence, for A1 and G
we cannot reject the relationship between observed prices and realized aggre-
gate external demand proposed in Hypothesis 4.3. Contrary to Hypothesis 4.3
between-treatment comparison shows that the average price levels differ signif-
icantly between the treatments and seem to follow different patterns depending
25The lack of any extreme price tendencies towards the end of the experiment in all
treatments suggests that the clearing rule with a virtual aftermarket deals effectively with
end-game effects.
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Table 4.3: Average Permit Prices on the Secondary Market
Compl. A4 A1 G Efficient
period price
1 29.953† >∗∗ 20.001 ≈ 17.043 15.80
(5.429) (2.857) (1.005)
2 25.349† >∗∗ 20.033† ≈ 19.643† 16.38
(2.117) (0.872) (1.638)
3 18.986 ≈ 17.948 ≈ 19.062 16.57
(4.952) (3.257) (2.324)
4 12.947† ≈ 12.650† <∗ 17.776 18.01
(2.143) (3.921) (3.208)
Total 21.947† >∗∗ 17.605 <∗ 18.361 16.69
(2.596) (1.812) (1.828)
Legend: † p < 0.1 for two-sided WSR-test for 6= efficient level;
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001 for one-sided MWU-test
for between-treatment differences. Note: Values per compliance
period, standard deviation across independent trading groups in
parenthesis.
on the allocation procedure.
In the auction treatments prices in the first half of the experiment are
inefficiently high and decrease to an inefficiently low level in the last compliance
period. In the grandfathering treatment no such trend can be recognized. In
total, when stability of prices is measured in the standard deviation of the
permit price within each trading group, prices tend to be most stable in G,
followed by A1 and then by A4. Hence, the allocation method obviously
affects price development even in treatments with similar allocation frequency
but different allocation rules.
The relationship between auction clearing prices and subsequent permit
prices in the secondary market, on the one hand, and between auction clearing
prices and expected permit prices, on the other, is a potential explanation for
the observed price development. Due to arbitrage opportunities we would not
expect significant differences between prices in one auction and the trade and
production stage which follows it. This conjecture is confirmed for A1 and for
most of the stages in A4. However, higher than efficient auction prices affect
the initial prices in the secondary market.26 As a result in the last compliance
26The willingness-to-pay expressed by the auction clearing price is compared to the ex-
pected (efficient) price, where the reference in A1 is the average efficient price in the respec-
tive compliance period and in A4 the average price in the subsequent trade and production
stage. Contrary to Hypothesis 4.5 the willingness-to-pay in the middle two auctions in A1
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Figure 4.3: Average Prices per Trading Period
period permit prices fall below the expected permit price.
Let us briefly comment on the effects the observed price dynamics have on
abatement, banking, and borrowing decisions. We observe that high initial
auction clearing prices in A1 and (even more so) in A4 lead to high prices in
the secondary market. These in turn lead to over–abatement and inefficient
banking, which increase permit supply relative to demand in later periods.
In treatment G, on the contrary, initial prices and abatement levels are in-
efficiently low and participants tend to borrow permits from the subsequent
periods. This leads to a relative shortage of permits in later trading periods
and to increased market clearing prices.
Result 4.2 (Permit Price) The average permit price and, in particular, its
temporal development depend on the allocation procedure. In the auction
treatments prices start off inefficiently high and decrease over time. In the
grandfathering treatment the opposite relationship is observed. It cannot be
rejected that the permit price depends positively on the level of realized ag-
and in the majority of auctions in A4 is significantly higher than the ex ante efficient and
expected permit price. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the reasons behind
the high auction prices. However, these results may be related to two common observations
in laboratory auctions. Firstly, overbidding in sealed bid auctions is one of the most robust
experimental results. Secondly, while it is frequently reported in sealed bid second price
auctions, it disappears in the strategically equivalent English auction, where the price paid
is more salient (see Kagel 1995, for a review of related literature). This may explain part of
the difference between the auction prices and those in the secondary market.
82
gregate demand. Only with frequent auctioning it is often different from the
expected permit price in later periods.
Result 4.3 (Auction) In the initial trading periods (in A4 in particular), the
willingness-to-pay in the auction does not equal the ex ante expected permit
price. The auction clearing price is generally higher than the expected permit
price.
Efficiency of Permit Allocation
We analyze two types of allocation efficiency after the fourth compliance
stage.27 The pre-trade allocation efficiency is the efficiency of allocation as
a result of the allocation method alone. It assumes that no secondary mar-
ket exists to amend for inefficiencies of the allocation rule and disregards any
changes in the efficiency brought about by the secondary market. The post-
trade allocation efficiency corrects for such assumptions.
The reference efficient level of emission permits in the fourth compliance
period is calculated for each participant separately. It takes into account the
value of one’s external demand and assumes that through a Walrasian process
the market price reflects the total realization of individual external demands.
Participants are considered to be a post-trade (pre-trade) buyer if they hold
fewer than the efficient level of permits at the time of the fourth compliance
check, where changes through trade are (not) considered. Similarly to Cason
and Gangadharan (2003), the efficiency of allocation at any time point is de-
fined as the overall amount of permits held by all current buyers in a market
as a share of the efficient amount of permits these same buyers should possess.
The pre-trade allocation efficiency in G was exogenously set to mimic the
pre-trade allocation efficiency in the benchmark treatment.28 Hence, we ana-
lyze it only for the auction treatments. Figure 4.4 depicts the overall pre-trade
and post-trade efficiency of permit allocation across treatments, Table 4.1 gives
the descriptive statistics. Although the secondary market leads to a significant
increase of efficiency, it remains significantly lower than 100% in all treatments.
27Due to trade opportunities in the last compliance stage, no unique banking equilibrium
exists, which prescribes the number of permits each participant should hold at the end of
the previous compliance stages.
28The insignificant difference between A1 and G was unavoidable due to design constraints.
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Figure 4.4: Overall Pre-trade and Post-trade Allocation
Efficiency
A between-treatment comparison cannot reject the null Hypothesis of equal
pre-trade efficiency of allocation in the auction treatments. The post-trade
efficiency in the last compliance period in A1 tends to be higher than in A4
but it is not significantly different from the one in G.
Efficient post-trade allocation requires that individual total permit demand
is proportionate to total individual external demand (see Hypothesis 4.4). Fig-
ure 4.5 shows the relationship between the total number of permits a partic-
ipant has purchased on any of the available markets and the total external
demand she faced over the whole experiment. The relationship is significantly
positive in A1 and G with robust coefficients of the estimated regression mod-
els for the last trading period, which were clustered on the trading group level,
of 0.951 and 1.090 respectively. The slope of the regression in A4 is 0.345
and not significantly different from zero. Given the abatement cost structure,
participants should have abated about half the expected emissions. The co-
efficients in the auction treatments are not significantly different from this
benchmark. The coefficient in G is significantly different (p = 0.012). No
significant between-treatment differences could be detected.
Result 4.4 (Auction) The frequency of auctioning does not affect the pre-
trade allocation of permits. Neither infrequent, nor frequent auctioning deliv-
ers efficient permit allocation with regard to expected emission goals.
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Figure 4.5: Relationship Between Total Permit Demand And
Total External Demand
Result 4.5 (Permit Demand) In the treatments with a single allocation
stage per compliance period individual permit demand (over all periods) is
proportional to total realized external demand (over all periods).
Result 4.6 (Allocation) The frequency of allocation affects the final alloca-
tive efficiency, whereas the allocation method – for free or against a payment –
does not have a significant impact as long as the initial distribution of permits
is similar. In all treatments, the secondary market fails to deliver near-perfect
efficiency.
Inefficient Trading Patterns at the Secondary Market
The average number of transactions per participant (selling and purchasing
together) is 42.81 (SD=32.88) in A1, 47.09 (SD=32.62) in A4, and 68.94
(SD=45.18) in G, respectively. For the auction treatments we do not find
a significant difference, which is surprising since in A4 the secondary mar-
ket should be needed less for correcting inefficiencies resulting from lack of
information. We do find significant differences between the benchmark and
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the grandfathering treatment, suggesting that participants are more willing to
correct an initial allocation that they did not determine themselves.
Table 4.4: Trade Inefficiencies by Player Type
Pre-trade % Post-trade Nett Efficient N
role buyers sold amount sold amount
A1 Seller 0.41 195.45 238.61 29
( 212.28 ) ( 185.28 )
Buyer 0.69 -111.14 -135.68 51
( 81.48 ) ( 73.01 )
A4 Seller 0.47 174.80 233.26 30
( 230.31) ( 213.48 )
Buyer 0.68 -104.88 -139.96 50
( 117.15 ) ( 82.68 )
G Seller 0.49 149.69 176.21 35
( 164.66) ( 116.35 )
Buyer 0.64 -116.42 -137.05 45
( 115.49) ( 57.22)
Note: Standard deviation within one treatment in parenthesis.
To investigate the reasons for inefficient post-trade allocations despite high
trading activity, we analyze the direction of permit exchange presented in
Table 4.4. There are two sources of inefficiency: First, when traders transact
although their trade is inefficient. Second, when profitable trades are not
executed. The second row gives an overview of the share of pre-trade sellers
(buyers) who sold too many (bought too few) permits given their external
demand and as a consequence became (remained) a post-trade buyer.29 Such
role switching is the result of the first inefficiency type. The third and the
fourth row list the average number of permits which were traded in the right
direction and the respective amount which should have been traded in order to
achieve perfect efficiency. The observed differences are the result of the second
inefficiency type. Hence, markets in all treatments fail to reach full efficiency
due to both – too much and too little trade.
Banking and Borrowing
As already discussed in the previous section, we observe a tendency to over-
bank permits. This is also in line with previous experiments on emissions
29The share of pre-trade buyers who became post-trade sellers is one minus the reported
share.
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trading (Gangadharan, Farrell and Croson 2005). Table 4.5 gives an overview
of the average number of banked permits per participant for each compliance
period.
Table 4.5: Average Banked Permits
Compliance A4 A1 G Efficient
period mean mean mean level
1 6.563† ≈ 4.850† >∗ -16.025 -14.741
(40.651) (91.214) (62.442)
2 29.588† ≈ 24.588† >∗ -2.813 -12.648
(42.663) (102.665) (63.512)
3 41.963† ≈ 48.938† >∗∗ 12.250† -3.710
(73.353) (98.426 ) (67.109)
4 30.013† ≈ 38.050† >∗ 11.738 0
(102.343 ) (92.522 ) (53.069 )
Legend: † p < 0.1 for two-sided WSR-test for 6= efficient level; ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001 for one-sided MWU-test for between-treatment
differences. Note: Values per compliance period, within-treatment standard
deviation in parenthesis.
Given the realized external demand, on average participants should have
been borrowing permits in all compliance periods. However, we observe bank-
ing in the auction treatments, which is significantly different from the efficient
borrowing level in all compliance periods. Banking in G is significantly dif-
ferent from the efficient level only in the third compliance period. As noted
above, deviations of the market price from the efficient one reflect inefficien-
cies in banking and borrowing behavior. Similar price dynamics in the auction
treatments are the result of similar banking and borrowing behavior. For de-
tails on the between-treatment comparison see Table 4.5.30
Result 4.7 (Banking and Borrowing) When permits are auctioned, a sig-
nificant amount of permits is banked, although the observed external demand
should induce borrowing. When permits are grandfathered, initial borrowing
is followed by later banking.
30One reason for inefficiently high banking in the auction treatments may be a sunk-cost
fallacy following the development of prices in these treatments. Having paid an (inefficiently)
high price for a permit, participants may fail to recognize that if prices are expected to fall
in the future, it is better to sell permits at a small loss in the current trade and production
stage, rather than at a big loss in later stages. The sunk-cost fallacy may also explain the
second type of trade inefficiencies discussed above.
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Non-Compliance
Contrary to Hypothesis 4.1, we observe frequent cases of non-compliance. The
descriptive statistics for the level and share of non-compliance in each period is
presented in Table 4.6. The first row in the table shows the average number of
missing permits, given that a participant was non-compliant. The middle row
shows the share of these missing permits from the total emissions in a BAU-
case. The last row contains the average share of non-compliant participants
from the total of 16 in one trading group.
Table 4.6: Non-compliant Permits and Participants
Compliance period Total
1 2 3 4
A1
Avg. amount of NC permits -60.125† -45.800 -62.500 -50.625 -53.913†
(41.684) (53.844) (27.577) (52.679) (45.135)
Avg. share of NC permits 0.044† 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.017†
Avg. Share of NC participants 0.100† 0.063 0.025 0.100 0.072†
A4
Avg. amount of NC permits -39.222† - -50.333 -72.750† -54.300†
(35.031) - (40.857) (71.749) (53.315)
Avg. share of NC permits 0.032† - 0.005 0.014† 0.017†
Avg. Share of NC participants 0.113† - 0.038 0.100 0.084†
G
Avg. amount of NC permits -48.000† -56.500 -43.250 -45.692 -48.056†
(31.102) (40.510) (24.226) (41.728) (35.076)
Avg. share of NC permits 0.057† 0.016 0.006 0.015 0.024†
Avg. Share of NC participants 0.016† 0.075 0.050 0.163 0.076†
Legend: †p < 0.1 for two-sided WSR-test for 6= efficient level. Note: Within-treatment
standard deviation in parenthesis.
In all treatments significantly positive non-compliance is observed, with
non-compliance rates being highest at the beginning and at the end of the
experiment. Possible reasons are therefore lack of understanding of the com-
pliance check mechanism (despite detailed instructions and a learning stage)
and shortage of funds, respectively.31
Result 4.8 (Compliance) On average noncompliance is significantly posi-
tive in all treatments.
31It was hard but not impossible to become bankrupt despite the constant flow of funds
from the fixed revenue income from the downstream product.
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4.5 Conclusion
Based on the results of an experiment, designed to closely mirror the insti-
tutional settings of the EU ETS, we show that the method of allocation may
affect the efficiency of the emissions trading system. We demonstrate that pay-
ing or not paying for emission permits does not affect the efficiency of permit
allocation after trade as long as the initial allocation of permits before trade
is fairly similar. It does affect, however, the average abatement level as well as
the dynamic efficiency of the instrument by inducing different price variability
and different distribution of abatement activities over time. Auctioning seems
to promote early rather than late abatement in comparison to free allocation
with the same distribution of permits among firms. However, auctioning also
leads to higher total compliance costs of the system and lower price stability,
which although not considered in our experiment, may have an effect on the
long-term incentives to invest in carbon-low technology. Furthermore, due to
overbidding in the auctions additional compliance costs arise, which can be
avoided through free allocation.
When comparing less to more frequent auctioning, we demonstrate that
there is a trade-off between the comfort of steady injection of liquidity, on the
one hand, and paying different prices for identical goods, on the other. The
first is usually an argument in favor of frequent auctioning brought forward by
regulated firms (and some theorists, see Hepburn et al. (2006) for an example).
The latter is typical in multiple auctions for identical goods (see Ashenfelter
1989, for an early report on this phenomenon) and is supported by our results.32
Having different prices for the same object hinders regulated firms in making
reliable investment plans. It also prevents the market from sending correct
price signals about the rentability of short-term abatement, thus compromising
the overall efficiency of the emissions trading system. In addition, frequent
auctioning affects the ability of the system to minimize joint compliance costs
by inducing lower efficiency of allocation after trade. Hence, if the regulator
chooses to allocate permits via auctioning, the experimental results would
recommend large and less frequent auctions.
32Differences of about 0.8 EUR were also observed in the Dutch and the Lithuanian
auctions of the EU ETS, which took place only a month apart (Co2-Handel.de 2012a; CO2-
Handel.de 2012b).
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In sum, we demonstrate that the method of permit allocation affects the
efficiency of the environmental instrument on multiple levels. When choos-
ing a method of allocation, the regulator should consider its impact on the
secondary market, price development, distribution of abatement decisions in
time, the ability of the market to provide efficient permit allocation, as well as
the banking and borrowing behavior resulting from all these factors.
90
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Derivation of the Theoretical Predictions
One Compliance Period
Consider the following game, which reproduces the stages of one compliance
period.
In the first stage (e.g. the allocation stage) a regulator introduces an emis-
sion cap X and distributes emission permits according to a certain allocation
rule (either grandfathering, or auctions, or a mixture of both) among n ex ante
identical firms. We denote by gi the number of permits firm i obtains for free
and by ai the number of permits i acquires in an auction at auction price p
a.
The second stage consists of T substages (e.g. trade and production stages).
In each of these substages the firms face exogenous demand Yit, i = 1, . . . , n,
t = 1, . . . , T , for a downstream product. The exogenous demand is ex ante
uncertain, e.g. Yit are independent random variables with distribution F (·)
and density f . Realized exogenous demand yit is privately observed by each
firm. We assume that the production of one unit of the downstream product
implies emission of one unit of emissions if a standard generation technology
is used. Production costs with the standard technology are normalized to 0.
Emissions can be avoided by using ”green” technology. Costs of abatement
C(rit) are increasing and convex (C
′(rit) > 0 and C
′′(rit) ≥ 0), where rit is the
number of units that is produced emission–free by firm i = 1, . . . , n in substage
t = 1, . . . , T . Any permits received in the first stage through grandfathering or
auctioning can be traded with the other firms in a common market. We denote
the price at the permit market in substage t by pet . As “dirty” production is
cost–free, firms are assumed to serve the entire external demand and receive
an exogenously fixed price py per unit of the downstream product.
In the third stage (e.g. compliance check stage) the regulator penalizes any
firm which in this stage does not possess enough permits to cover its emissions
from the second stage. The height of the fine depends on the per-unit penalty
f e and the number of missing permits Ni.
We solve the game by backwards induction. Let dit denote the permit
demand of firm i in substage t. The profit function of each firm i = 1, ..., n in
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the last substage before compliance check is given by
piiT = p
y
T∑
t=1
yit −
T∑
t=1
C(rit)−
T−1∑
t=1
petdit − p
aai
− peT (
T∑
t=1
yit −
T∑
t=1
rit − (ai + gi)−Ni)−Nif
e.
When the fine for noncompliance is greater than the permit price, the first
derivative of the profit function with respect toNi is always negative (
∂pii
∂Ni
(ri, Ni) =
peT −f
e < 0 for f e > peT ). Hence, a profit maximizing firm is always compliant.
In the following we assume that the fine is high enough (as it is the case in the
experimental design), set Ni = 0 and disregard Ni in our further analysis (see
Hypothesis 4.1).
In the last substage firm i takes its demand for permits, abatement levels
and permit prices from the previous substages as given and maximizes its profit
by choosing the optimal riT . Differentiation with respect to riT yields
∂piiT
∂riT
= −C ′(riT ) + p
e
T = 0 ⇔ p
e
T = C
′(riT ).
Firms have identical cost structures and therefore choose the same abate-
ment levels in the last trading and production stage (see Hypothesis 4.2). Since
firms choose to be compliant, if the fine is high enough (see above), abatement
must be chosen such that emissions meet the cap:
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(yit − rit) = X (4.1)
Since firms have identical costs structures, in the last substage they all
choose the same abatement level, which is equal to the permit price peT in the
last substage. It therefore holds that
riT (p
e
T ) =
n∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
yit −
T−1∑
t=1
rit
)
−X
n
(4.2)
92
and
peT = C
′

n∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
yit −
T−1∑
t=1
rit
)
−X
n
 (4.3)
Thus, the permit price in the last substage depends positively on the level of
total realized external demand over all substages regardless of the allocation
mechanism (see Hypothesis 4.3).
Now let us consider substage T − 1. Since compliance is only controlled for
in the third stage, permits in T − 1 and T are perfect substitutes. Thus, in
any equilibrium it must hold that peT−1 = E[p
e
T ]. But then firms will choose
to abate as much as they expect to abate in the last substage (see Hypothesis
4.2), i.e.
ri(T−1) = E[riT ] =
n∑
i=1
(
T−1∑
t=1
yit + E[YT ]−
T−1∑
t=1
rit
)
−X
n
=
n∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=1
yit −
n∑
i=1
T−2∑
t=1
rit
n
+ E[YT ]− ri(T−1) −
X
n
The last equality holds because firms always choose equal abatement levels,
independently of their privately observed exogenous demand. Thus, in equi-
librium it holds that
ri(T−1) =
1
2

n∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=1
yit
n
+ E[YT ]−
n∑
i=1
T−2∑
t=1
rit
n
−
X
n

and
pei(T−1) = E[p
e
T ] = C
′
12

n∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=1
yit
n
+ E[YT ]−
n∑
i=1
T−2∑
t=1
rit
n
−
X
n


Since E[Yt] = E[Y ] for all t = 1, . . . , T , by way of induction it is easy to
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show for any substage k the optimal abatement level is
r∗ik =
1
T − k + 1

n∑
i=1
k∑
t=1
yit
n
+ (T − k)E[Y ]−
n∑
i=1
k−1∑
t=1
r∗it
n
−
X
n
 (4.4)
where r∗it = r
∗
t for all i = 1, . . . , n denotes the efficient abatement level in all
preceding stages. Note that in stage k the participants have already observed
the first k realizations of their external demand. In a competitive and fric-
tionless trading market aggregate external demand is ”revealed” in the market
clearing price at the spot market.The efficient abatement level implicitly de-
termines the efficient price level:
pe∗k = C
′ (r∗ik)
The results so far are independent of the allocation mechanism. Now, let us
finally look at the allocation stage prior to the T trade and production stages.
Ex ante, i.e. before firms have privately observed any of their external demand,
the expected abatement level (and implicitly the expected permit price) is the
same for all substages t = 1, . . . , T , namely
E[rt] =
1
T
(
E
[
T∑
t=1
Yt
]
−
X
n
)
.
Hence, each firm’s ex ante expected profit is given by:
pii(1) = E
[
T∑
t=1
Yt
]
py − TC
(
1
T
(
E
[
T∑
t=1
Yt
]
−
X
n
))
− C ′
(
1
T
(
E
[
T∑
t=1
Yt
]
−
X
n
))(
X
n
− ai − gi
)
− paai
Differentiation with respect to ai yield that each firm bids at most
pa = C ′
(
1
T
(
E
[
T∑
t=1
Yt
]
−
X
n
))
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on E
[
T∑
t=1
Yt
]
− gi units in the auction (see Hypothesis 4.5).
Multiple Compliance Periods
One complete game from above represents one compliance period. Assume that
the game is repeated m times and that borrowing and banking between the
compliance periods is allowed. As long as no extreme shocks in the supply of
permits or exogenous demand for the downstream product, efficient borrowing
is possible. Hence, permits in the mT trading and production stages over all
compliance periods become perfect substitutes. The efficient permit price in
substage k = 1, . . . ,mT is then given by pe∗k (r
∗
t ) = C
′(r∗t ), where
r∗t =
1
mT − k + 1
(∑n
i=1
∑k
t=1 yit
n
+ (mT − k)E[Y ]−
∑n
i=1
∑k−1
t=1 r
∗
it
n
−
mX
n
)
The optimal abatement level r∗ik, allows us to calculate the optimal individual
permit demand of participant i in substage k:
d∗ik = yik − r
∗
ik,
and, of course, average permit demand over all stages. Note that due to the
compliance check regulations and banking and borrowing freedom in the model,
dik is not necessarily equal to the amount of permits a participant acquires in
stage k. Thus, participant i must possess
∑mT
k=1 dik permits in the end, but it is
not uniquely determined in which periods they should be acquired. Therefore,
a unique individual banking or borrowing amount from one compliance period
to the next does not exists. We call the total amount to be jointly banked
or borrowed by all participants between two compliance periods BBτ , where
τ = 1, . . . ,m33:
BB∗τ =
n∑
i=1
∑
k∈τ
dik −X.
Note that if there is an auction before each trade and production stage,
the game becomes equivalent to the basic game with one substage and mT
33Given the randomly drawn values for the external demand used in the experiment,
we find that all values of the optimal banking and borrowing are feasible in any of the
treatments.
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repetitions. The banking and borrowing conditions remain unaffected. Hence,
the results from above are independent of the number of auctions as long as
the total number of permits is equal in both allocation mechanisms.
4.6.2 Instructions
In the following the instructions for the experiment are provided. A [Treatment]
indicates which sections were present only in the instructions of the respective
treatment. Thank you for taking part in our trading experiment. Please read
these instructions carefully. Before with proceed with the experiment, we will
check your understanding by asking a few questions. Simultaneously, you
will also have the opportunity to become acquainted with the experimental
environment.
In this experiment you can earn money whereby the sum of your earnings
depends on your decisions and the decisions of others. Your earnings will be
calculated in virtual money-units “GE”. After the game is over, their Euro
value will be calculated at an exchange rate of 450 virtual units for one Euro
and you will receive this value together with a show-up-fee of 2.50 Euros.
Your situation
You and 15 other participants in the experiment will be able to trade with each
other in a market. At no time will you be told who the other 15 participants
are. Throughout the whole experiment you will be trading with the same 15
participants. Thus, the composition of your group will not change. Every
participant was given these instructions.
[A1, A4] You will receive an initial endowment of 5500 GE. You will then
have the task of serving the demand for a good. The level of the demand
will be a random number between 5 and 55. Every number has the same
probability. The demand you have to serve is independent of the demand the
other participants have to serve.
[G] You will receive an initial endowment in GE. You will be told the amount
of GE when the experiment begins. You will then have the task of serving the
demand for a good. The level of the demand will be a random number between
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5 and 55. Every number has the same probability. The demand you have to
serve is independent of the demand the other participants have to serve.
At the beginning you do not know the level of demand. It changes every
trading-period and will be disclosed to you in the information-box in the top
left hand corner of your screen (see figure at the end of these instructions). For
each unit of demand you are required to serve, you will be paid a fixed price
of 25 GE. This means that as soon as you are informed about the level of the
demand, your will receive - as an advance payment - 25 GE for every unit of
the good demanded in this trading period. You receive this advance payment
regardless of whether you have enough units of the good to serve the demand
or not.
There are altogether 16 trading periods. After every four trading-periods, we
will check if you have provided a sufficient amount of the good to serve the
demand in these four trading-periods. Should you not be able to serve the
demand, you will have to pay a fee for every missing unit of the good and
you will also have to retroactively provide any missing units. Details will be
explained later in the text.
[A1, A4] You have the following options to fulfill your demand-serving obliga-
tions:
1. You can produce units of the good by yourself;
2. You can trade units of the good in a market;
3. You can purchase units of the good in auctions organized by the experi-
menter.
[G] You have the following options to fulfill your demand-serving obligations:
1. You can produce units of the good by yourself;
2. You can trade units of the good in a market;
3. You will be allocated free units of the good by the experimenter.
These options can be combined to satisfy the given demand. Details will be
explained later in the text.
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Self-Production
When a trading period is running, you can see the production-box below the
infoformation-box (see screenshot at the end of the instructions). In this box,
you can determine the number of units you want to provide through self-
production. You can produce only once per trading-period. The amount of
your self-production cannot exceed the demand level in the respective trading-
period.
Self-production induces costs. These costs amount to 1 GE for the first pro-
duced unit, 2 GE for the second produced unit, 3 GE for the third produced
unit, and increase by 1 GE for every additional unit you produce by yourself.
The sum of the production costs over all units gives the total production costs.
The following table illustrates how the production costs are calculated.
Amount of self- Additional costs caused by Total production costs
production last produced unit for this amount
1 1 1
2 2 3
3 3 6
4 4 10
... ... ...
n n
n∑
i=1
i
If you click on the button “Calculate”, we will calculate the total costs of
production for you. In addition to that, at the end of these instructions we have
provided you with a table which gives an overview of the costs per additional
unit and the total costs.
Please keep in mind that you should make your production decision before the
respective trading-period is over.
Trading rules
Together with self-production you can serve some of the demand through trad-
ing in a market. In the market you can:
• make bids for buying an amount of the good (“bids”),
• make offers for selling an amount of the good (“asks”),
• or delete an already stated bid/ask.
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[A1, A4] Every trading period takes at least 3 minutes and 30 seconds and at
most 4 minutes. The exact time will be determined by chance. Every time
spread between 3 minutes 30 seconds and 4 minutes can occur with the same
probability. When a trading period is over, any open bid/ask will expire.
[G] Both free allocated and self-produced units can be traded. Every trading
period takes at least 3 minutes and 30 seconds and at most 4 minutes. The
exact time will be determined by chance. Every time spread between 3 minutes
30 seconds and 4 minutes can occur with the same probability. When a trading
period is over, any open bid/ask will expire.
By posting bids and asks you can trade with the other participants in your
market. Bids can only be posted if the bid’s value doesn’t exceed your dispos-
able capital. Your disposable capital is calculated by subtracting the value of
your open bids in the market from your total capital. Asks can only be posted,
if you posses at least as many units as you want to sell and these units are not
reserved for other currently open asks of yours.
You can see your “disposable capital” (German: “verfu¨gbares Vermo¨gen”) and
your “disposable goods” (German: “verfu¨gbare Gu¨ter”) at the top left corner
of the trading period’s screen. At the screen’s bottom you see your currently
open bids/asks. (see screenshot at the end of the instructions)
Posting an ask
An example for an ask is “I offer 4 units for 48 GE per unit”. The ask’s price
and amount must be in whole numbers and higher than or equal to 1.
Your ask will be traded instantly, only if it is the ask with the lowest price
and if this price is equal to or lower than the price of the highest bid in the
bids’ queue. Otherwise it will be listed in the asks’ queue. Open asks are
listed on the right, upper half of the screen. (see screenshot at the end of the
instructions)
Posting a bid
An example for a bid is “I would like to buy 8 units and I offer 12 GE per
unit”. The bid’s price and amount must be in whole numbers and greater than
or equal to 1.
Your bid will be traded instantly, only if it is the bid with the highest price
and if this price is equal to or higher than the lowest ask in the asks’ queue.
Otherwise it will be listed in the bids’ queue.
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Open bids are listed on the right, lower half of the screen. (see figure at the
end of production)
Attention: In the case of instant trading, every ask you post will
be matched with precisely one bid (the highest). By the same to-
ken, every bid you post will be matched with precisely one ask (the
lowest).
Transaction price
The price will be determined in the following manner:
• If the prices of the matched bid and ask are equal, they will be traded
at this price.
• If prices differ, trade will take place at the price of the older post. Thus,
if the bid you just posted is matched with an older ask with a lower
price, the transaction will be carried out at the ask’s price. If the ask
you just posted is matched with an older bid with a higher price, the
trading transaction will be carried out at the bid’s price.
Example for the Transaction Price
Transaction amount
As in the case of instant trading every bid/ask will be matched with precisely
one older ask/bid, the amount of goods to be transacted is determined in the
following manner:
• If the bid or the ask you just posted has a lower or an equal amount to
the ask or bid it is matched with, the complete amount of your bid/ask
will be traded.
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• If the bid or the ask you just posted has a higher amount than the ask
or bid it is matched with, only the smaller amount amount of the older
ask or bid will be traded. This means that your bid or ask will be only
partly transacted. All remaining units from your offer will expire and
will not be served by other asks or bids in the queue. If you want to
trade more units, you will have to post two sequential offers.
Example for Transaction Amount of an Instant Offer
If your ask is already listed in the asks’ queue, though, and a bid, which was
posted later demands a smaller amount than the amount your ask offers, the
non-transacted part of your ask remains listed. By the same token, the rest of
your bid remains listed if it was already listed in the bids’ queue and an ask,
which was posted later, offers a smaller amount than your bid demands.
Example for Transaction Amount of a Standing Offer
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Deleting bids and asks
In the left, lower half of the screen you see a list of your posted bids and asks.
You can delete these at any time. Keep in mind that you cannot alter any
posted bids or asks – you can only delete them. Bids or asks cannot be deleted
after they have been accepted by other traders.
Rankings of bids and asks
Posted bids are listed in the bids’ queue. Posted asks are listed in the asks’
queue. Both lists are sorted by price and time of the posting. When two or
more bids/asks with the same price are listed in a queue, they are ranked by
time, the older one coming first.
In the middle you can see the price of the last transaction. If there has not
been any trading yet, you will see an “–”. A bid/ask remains in its queue until
it is deleted or accepted by another trader and, as a consequence, trade takes
place.
Self-trade
It is allowed to trade with yourself. This does not change the most recent price
being displayed and is not listed as a trade either. Trading with oneself can
be regarded as withdrawing part of your own offer.
[A1, A4] Auction rules
How to make a bid in the auction
[A1] In addition to self-production and trading, you can serve parts of the
demand by purchasing units of the good in auctions organized by the exper-
imenter. These auctions are scheduled before the control period (see picture
at the end of the instructions). Furthermore, there will be an auction at the
beginning of the experiment, before the first trading period starts. There will
not be any auctions after the last trading period, before the last control period
at the end of the experiment, though. Overall, there will be 4 auctions. In
each auction 960 units of the good will be sold.
[A4] In addition to self-production and trading, you can serve parts of the
demand by purchasing units of the good in auctions organized by the exper-
imenter. These auctions are scheduled after each trading period (see picture
at the end of the instructions). Furthermore, there will be an auction at the
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beginning of the experiment, before the first trading period starts. There will
not be any auctions after the last trading period, before the last control period
at the end of the experiment, though. Overall, there will be 16 auctions. In
each auction 240 units of the good will be sold.
You can submit bids in the auction as price-quantity combinations. We will
specify 11 prices for which you will have to state the number of units you
are willing to buy at this particular price. The stated amount for a certain
price cannot be higher than the amount for a lower price. Furthermore, only
whole numbers – starting from “0” – will be accepted as valid numbers for the
amount you wish to buy at a certain price. By clicking on “Check” you can
see if your set of auction bids is consistent with these rules without making a
binding bid schedule.
You will be given 2 minutes to state your set of requested amounts as a binding
bid schedule. Your auction bids will remain unknown for the other participants,
so that the time you make the bid will not influence in any way your chances
to win units in the auction. Only your final auction bids, which you transmit
through clicking on “Send” will be taken into account.
Calculation of the clearing price and serving the auction bids
After the auction on the basis of your auction bids your demand function
will be estimated. For every price the sum of the requested amounts by all
participants will be calculated. Then, every price-amount-combination formed
in the described way will be connected linearly. This gives the aggregated
demand function. As the figure below shows, it is decreasing.
For every price the total, aggregated requested amount by all participants
will be calculated. The price, for which the aggregated demand matches the
amount supplied by the experimenter, is the auction’s clearing price. Please,
keep in mind that this price can be between those specified by us for you to
bid on. On the basis of individual auction bid it will be calculated how many
units of the good every participant would want to buy at the clearing price.
This amount will be credited to the winners. They will pay the clearing price
for every unit.
Should the aggregated demand over all participants at the lowest price of
“0” be lower than the supply amount in the auction, surplus units would be
distributed among participants in the group proportionately to their bids at
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the price “0”. Should the aggregate demand at the highest price of “50” exceed
the supply amount in the auction, all bids at the highest price would be served
only partially.
After the end of the auction you will be informed about the auction clearing
price and the amount you bought.
Figure 4.6: Calculating the Auction Clearing Price
[G] Free allocation
In addition to self-production and trading, you can serve some of the demand
with those units the experimenter will hand you for free. These allocations are
scheduled before the control period (see picture at the end of the instructions).
Furthermore, there will be an allocation at the beginning of the experiment,
before the first trading period starts. There will not be an allocation after the
last trading period, before the last control period at the end of the experiment,
though. Overall, there will be 4 free allocations.
In each allocation 960 units of the good will be distributed amongst the par-
ticipants in your group. Each participant may receive a different amount of
free units. Each time there is a free allocation three participants will receive
14 units. Three other participants will receive 20 units. Four other partici-
pants will receive 42 units. Three other participants will receive 90 units. The
remaining three participants will receive 140 units (3 · 14 + 3 · 20 + 4 · 42 + 3 ·
90 + 3 · 140 = 960).
Before the experiment starts, the amount of free units for each participant
will be randomly chosen according to the values from above. The resulting
amount set for each participant at the beginning will not change during the
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experiment. Thus, the participant will receive this amount at each of the free
allocations.
You will be told the amount you receive along with your initial endowment
when the experiment starts.
Control and punishment
[A1, A4] Four times throughout the experiment – after every fourth trading
period – we will check whether you can serve the demand from these periods
through self-production and purchases. With this aim, the amount of goods
you provided through self-production and purchases will be compared to the
last 4 trading periods’ summed up demand. The summed up demand from the
last 4 trading periods will be subtracted from the amount of goods you have
provided up to this point. If the difference is smaller than “0”, this would
mean that you are not able to serve the demand. In this case you will be
charged 40 GE for every missing unit. This punishment will not release you
from the obligation to retroactively provide any missing units. Thus, in case
of punishment, any missing amounts will be transferred into the next period.
[G] Four times throughout the experiment – after every fourth trading period
– we will check whether you can serve the demand from these periods through
self-production, purchases and free allocations. With this aim, the amount of
goods you provided through self-production and purchases will be compared
to the last 4 trading periods’ summed up demand. The summed up demand
from the last 4 trading periods will be subtracted from the amount of goods
you have provided up to this point. If the difference is smaller than “0”, this
would mean that you are not able to serve the demand. In this case you will
be charged 40 GE for every missing unit. This punishment will not release you
from the obligation to retroactively provide any missing units. Thus, in case
of punishment any missing amounts will be transferred into the next period.
Hence, you do not have to serve every trading period’s demand by the end of
the respective trading period, but only the summed up demand of 4 trading
periods within the respective control period.
Because the experiment ends after the last control period, you will not be able
to retroactively provide any missing units. These will be sold to you at the
long-term equilibrium price. As a result, your GE capital will be decreased by
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Example for the Control Procedure
the value of the missing units. By the same token, any surplus units after the
end of the experiment will be bought from you at the long-term equilibrium
price leading to an increase of your GE capital by the value of the surplus
units.
The long-term equilibrium price is the price resulting from the best possible
combination of all participants’ purchase and self-production of units of the
good. This price is a theoretical value and cannot be influenced by any of the
participants.
Example for Credits at the End of the Experiment
[A1] Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure is identical for all participants from your group.
It is depicted in the figure below. Details on the different stages were explained
above.
There are four control periods. Every control period consists of 4 trading
periods. Before each control there is an auction. There is no auction before
the last control. Furthermore, an auction precedes the first trading period at
the beginning of the experiment. Thus, altogether there are 4x4=16 trading
periods and 4 auctions. In every auction 960 units of the good are auctioned
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Figure 4.7: Experimental Procedure [A1]
off. After each auction you receive the units you have won and your capital of
GE is charged accordingly.
At the beginning of every trading period you will be informed about the de-
mand you have to serve in this trading period. Simultaneously, you will re-
ceive an advance payment for this demand regardless of your ability to serve
it. Please note that at the beginning of every new trading period, open bids
or asks from the previous trading period expire.
Every four trading periods are followed by a control stage, which checks whether
you have met the sum of the demand of the 4 preceding trading periods. In
case of missing units you are punished. After the last control stage the missing
units will be sold to you and any surplus units will be bought from you by the
experimenter automatically.
[A4] Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure is identical for all participants from your group.
It is depicted in the figure below. Details on the different stages were explained
above.
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Figure 4.8: Experimental Procedure [A4]
There are four control periods. Every control period consists of 4 trading
periods. After each trading period there is an auction. There is no auction
before the last control. Furthermore, an auction precedes the first trading
period at the beginning of the experiment. Thus, altogether there are 4x4=16
trading periods and 16 auctions. In every auction 240 units of the good are
auctioned off. After each auction you receive the units you have won and your
capital of GE is charged accordingly.
At the beginning of every trading period you will be informed about the de-
mand you have to serve in this trading period. Simultaneously, you will re-
ceive an advance payment for this demand regardless of your ability to serve
it. Please note that at the beginning of every new trading period, open bids
or asks from the previous trading period expire.
Every four trading periods are followed by a control stage, which checks whether
you have met the sum of the demand of the 4 preceding trading periods. In
case of missing units you are punished. After the last control stage the missing
units will be sold to you and any surplus units will be bought from you by the
experimenter automatically.
[G] Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure is identical for all participants from your group.
It is depicted in the figure below. Details on the different stages were explained
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above.
Figure 4.9: Experimental Procedure [G]
There are four control periods. Every control period consists of 4 trading
periods. There is an allocation before each control. There is no allocation
before the last control. Furthermore, an allocation precedes the first trading
period at the beginning of the experiment. Thus, altogether there are 4x4=16
trading periods and 4 allocations. In every allocation 960 units of the good
are distributed amongst the participants in your group.
At the beginning of every trading period you will be informed about the de-
mand you have to serve in this trading period. Simultaneously, you will re-
ceive an advance payment for this demand regardless of your ability to serve
it. Please note that at the beginning of every new trading period, open bids
or asks from the previous trading period expire.
Every four trading periods are followed by a control stage, which checks whether
you have met the sum of the demand of the 4 preceding trading periods. In
case of missing units you are punished. After the last control stage the missing
units will be sold to you and any surplus units will be bought from you by the
experimenter automatically.
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Figure 4.10: Screenshot from the Trading and Production Stage
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Amount of Additional costs Total costs Amount of Additional costs Total costs
production caused by last of production production caused by last of production
produced unit for this amount produced unit for this amount
1 1 1 31 31 496
2 2 3 32 32 528
3 3 6 33 33 561
4 4 10 34 34 595
5 5 15 35 35 630
6 6 21 36 36 666
7 7 28 37 37 703
8 8 36 38 38 741
9 9 45 39 39 780
10 10 55 40 40 820
11 11 66 41 41 861
12 12 78 42 42 903
13 13 91 43 43 946
14 14 105 44 44 990
15 15 120 45 45 1035
16 16 136 46 46 1081
17 17 153 47 47 1128
18 18 171 48 48 1176
19 19 190 49 49 1225
20 20 210 50 50 1275
21 21 231 51 51 1326
22 22 253 52 52 1378
23 23 276 53 53 1431
24 24 300 54 54 1485
25 25 325 55 55 1540
26 26 351
27 27 378
28 28 406
29 29 435
30 30 465
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This work presents the results of three experimental studies that investigate
how changes in the auction environment or the auction rules can affect the
auction outcome. All studies find that, if theorists want to predict the out-
come of an auction correctly, they need to account for a number of behavioral
anomalies.
In particular, Chapter 2 studies behavior in auctions with and without am-
biguity and shows that without accounting for nonlinear probability weighting,
standard theories are incapable of explaining the experimental results. Non-
linear probability weighting is a widely established behavioral phenomenon
(Prelec 1998), which has received little attention in the context of auctions.
Armantier and Treich (2009) are one of the few exceptions – they show that
when nonlinear probability weighting is controlled for, the effect of risk aversion
on overbidding decreases substantially. Chapter 2 provides another example
of the importance of nonlinear probability weighting in the context of auc-
tions, thus supporting the notion that future research on bidding behavior in
auctions should attempt to account for this behavioral phenomenon.
Chapter 3 investigates experimentally the predictions of two models of auc-
tions with favoritism studied in Burguet and Perry (2009). It also shows that
unless risk aversion and bounded rationality are accounted for, the experimen-
tal results only partially support the theoretical predictions. More importantly,
the alleged optimality of one of the mechanisms with favoritism is shown to
be highly contingent on the favored bidder behaving rationally. Hence, the
practical applicability of the optimal mechanism is contested and future re-
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search should provide optimal mechanisms more robust to boundedly rational
behavior.
Finally, the experimental study presented in Chapter 4 shows that while one
big and several smaller auctions for multiple homogenous goods lead to similar
allocation after the auctions, the prices paid differ substantially and so does
the development of an aftermarket. Although the causes for this observation
are not explicitly discussed in Chapter 4, the “declining price anomaly” we ob-
serve in the sequential auctions for homogenous goods is a commonly reported
phenomenon (see Ashenfelter 1989, for example). Risk aversion has been iden-
tified as one of its possible causes (Mezzetti 2011). Given that prior to the
introduction of the US Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the European Emission
Trading Scheme, most of the analysis regarding the auction frequency was
only theoretical, future research should also attempt to enrich the analysis of
multi-unit auctions to account for boundedly rational behavior.
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